'File E5. Murder of Sheikh Selman bin Diaij and 25 others on the 3rd December 1900 at Deraya by the Behaih' [‎112r] (223/252)

3. Sheikh Esa has informed me that Sheikh Rashid, the Behaih Chief,
came over to Bahrein about 3 months after the retaliatory attack made by the
three Amamara on Sheikh Rashid's young son, with a view to getting satis
faction from the Chief for the boy's murder. Presumably he did not consider
that Amamara were justified in visiting upon his own family their vengeance
for the act of his four tribesmen, and professing for the time being to regard
himself as one of Sheikh Esa's subsidized feudatories he appealed to him for
the punishment of the guilty Amamara. One of whom at least was and is still a
trusted servant of the Bahrein Chief,
4. Sheikh Esa says " I told Sheikh Rashid that his son was murdered for
the blood of Abdallah AI Mutawwa of the Amamara tribe, that the two tribes
should settle their feud amongst themselves, and that the matter was no con
cern of mine. If, however, Sheikh Rashid would abandon the feud, it would be
so much the better. Sheikh Rashid replied that he had only peaceful inten
tions. I then gave him as a token of my friendship a horse worth 600 dollars
and cash and other things to the value of 200 dollars. This gift was in no way
connected with the blood-feud between the Behaih and the Amamara. Bin
Muqareh promised to continue loyal and friendly to me and went away apparent
ly quite satisfied. His subsequent action proved his insincerity." From this
account it is not difficult to understand that Sheikh Rashid must have been
chagrined at Sheikh Esa's refusal to punish the Amamara, his subjects, and that
the Bahrein Chief's gift was made chiefly in connection with his foolish custom
of subsidizing the mainland Bedouin whenever they come to the Islands to renew
their assurances of loyalty and service. Sheikh Rashid no doubt saw the wisdom
of dissembling his dissatisfaction while in Bahrein, but it is not surprising that
he should have left, determined in his mind to wreak vengeance in future upon
any of the people of Bahrein who should fall into his hands, and the more nearly
connected they might be to the Chief the greater satisfaction would be his.
5. In the course of my recent work connected with the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Gazetteer,
so far as it relates to this Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. , I have satisfied myself that the southern
boundary of the Katar Peninsula is regarded by all the Arabs as a fairly straight
line from Salwa at the Apex of the Gulf of Bahrein on the west to the Khor al
Odeid on the east, passing one well-known well named Saqaq about midway
between these two points. The whole of the country north of the Salwa Apex
as far as the Katif Oasis is known as Dthaharan, and this District as well the
country due south of Katar up to the Oman border is frequented only by tribes,
the Ejman, Beni Hajir and Al Morra, who are subsidized to a small extent by the
Turkish Government for the safe passage of their mails, and it must therefore
presumably be regarded as Turkish territory. It results, therefore, that if the
Chief of Bahrein is permitted to send an expedition against the Behaih on the
mainland, it will either be operating on admittedly Turkish soil or else in Katar
and in the latter case the question of the status of that Peninsula will probably
become acutely and prematurely prominent.
6. In my humble opinion the permission which His Majesty's Government
contemplate granting to Sheikh Esa to take his own measures for revenging him
self should emphatically be withheld. I have endeavoured to show that the
three outrages which have already occurred are all incidents of the one feud, and
if the next aggressive action is taken by the Bahreinis, it will be impossible to
put a limit upon the evils which may ensue. The Bahreinis, in consequence of
their commercial connection with Hofuf and Katif, are always in a vulnerable
position whilst the Behaih are extremely difficult to touch when on their
guard, and moreover, judging from my observations of the conduct of
Sheikh Esa's 'soldiers' in my two recent little expeditions after the pirate Ahmed
bin Selman, I believe that whilst a fair fight would be avoided to the utmost
extent of their power a number of murders of innocent persons would quite pos
sibly result which would involve the Chief in difficulties of much greater magni
tude.
7. The Turkish Government have argued that the Bahreinis are entitled to
no consideration, because they landed on Turkish soil without permission and
with arms in their hands.