'Report on the operations carried out in the southern desert in connection with the Iraq-Najd borders, November 1927-May 1928.' [‎10r] (19/66)

15
that they would raid the tribes in Southern Kuwait, round
Jahra, and possibly attempt an attack on Kuwait itself. 1 he
Harb were believed to be the most loyal to Ibn Sa'ud and were
likely to be the last to break loose from his control. In the
past they have raided up the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan towards Amman,
and they might attack the Anaizah near Rutbah.
44. If there was any truth in these rumours we might have
to deal with forces of anything up to 50,000 men, though it
was unlikely that individual raiding parties would exceed
4,000 owing to difficulties of water supplies, etc. These might
launch attacks on Kuwait, Basrah, the Basrah-Baghdad
railway, Karbala and Najaf, the Anaizah tribe, or on Amman,
Ma'an, or Akaba. In addition the trans-desert route from
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan to Baghdad would become exposed to attack.
Our intelligence at the time discredited the likelihood of such
a combination, or that Ibn Sa'ud, as far as our evidence went,
would definitely sanction large scale attacks on 'Iraq. It
was, however, still doubtful to what extent he was responsible
for the series of small raids previously carried out by the
Mutair. Although no confirmation of this report could be
obtained, the difficulty of finding out what was really happening
in Najd made it impossible to ignore the possibility of attacks
in considerable strength. Public opinion, too, was very
exercised by alarmist reports of the proclamation of a holy
war which was given much prominence in the Press.
45. The first step taken to meet this situation was to reinforce
Akforce by a Flight of No. 30 (B) Squadron and a section of
armoured cars from Hinaidi on 29th February, this section
being replaced at Hinaidi by the section from Kirkuk. A new
section of armoured cars was formed at Hinaidi from reserves
in the Command and was completed by 9th March. Arrange
ments were made for one Flight of Victorias of No. 216 (B)
Squadron to be held in readiness to proceed to 'Iraq from
Heliopolis if required.
46. On the 5th March, an armoured train, manned by a
detachment of the 3rd/5th Mahratta Light Infantry, arrived
at Ur for use on the Ur-Basrah line. Arrangements were made
by the 'Iraq Government to persuade the 'Iraqi tribes to
withdraw behind the line Jarishan-Busaiya-Sulman-Shabicha.
47. On 18th March, two companies of the 'Iraq Army left
Samawa to occupy the wells at Shabicha, arriving there on the
25th. During their march, aircraft and cars co-operated with
them, the cars being based on Shabicha from the 22nd. This
was necessary for the purpose of stabilising the Anaizah, some
of whose sections were camped in the A1 Jil area, while Mahrut