'The Seven Independent Arabian States [Yemen, ‘Asir, Hijaz, Najd, Kuwait, Jabal Shammar and al-Jawf]' [‎264v] (528/680)

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I should be glad to receive your view.s in order that this question may be settled
as early as possible.
2. Can you also state what approximate date would be convenient for conference
from Burma Government's point of view and who representatives from Burma will
be (see my telegram 10th August, No. 197^) ? {^So. <0).
No. 84.
P.Z. 5965/34.
Telegram from Government of Burma to Government of India,
dated ZOth September 1934.
{Repeated to Secretary of State for India.)
137. Secretary of State's telegrams 2089 (No. 82) and 2091 (No. 81), 29th August,
and your telegram of the 17th instant, 1767 (No. 77). Regret delay in replying.
2. Boundary in 1894 Convention was based on Scott's reports. There can be
no doubt that Scott's delimitation gave effect to conventional boundary and the
British Government have told China that they regard it as the boundary settled
by the Convention to which China was co-signatory. Boundary question has now
passed beyond an inter-Provincial question and has become an international issue,
and the Governor recognises that considerations will enter in which are outside the
Local Government's sphere and cognisance.
But from experience in Burma of Chinese official methods, Governor is con
vinced of the danger of allowing China to repudiate the Convention and getting
her way by the methods which she has pursued in regard to this boundary. Such
a result would involve disaster, loss of prestige, and lead to repetition of the same
tactics and, from local point of view, would have reactions all along the frontier
which w r ould make very difficult relations with Chinese frontier officials, which, as
it is, are not easy. Governor is therefore stongly opposed to any offer to China of
ex gratia concessions to induce her to keep her bond. He considers that inter
change of concessions should De on mutual basis of compromise emphasised in
Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs' interview with Teichman, 9th August
(N T o. 73), and in Chinese Foreign Ministry Note of 9th August.
3. Governor considers approach suggested by Teichman is most promising and
suggests that, in order to establish basis for further negotiations, first efforts of the
conference should be to get agreement to a Joint Boundary Commission to ascertain
on the ground and fix on maps, line resulting from application of the 1894
Convention. In view of the failure of the 1900 Boundary Commission and of the
Chinese Government's present attitude, Governor suggests that the Chinese Govern
ment should, if possible, be induced to agree to appointment by the League of
Nations of Third Boundary Commissioner, b3 T whose decision both parties should
be bound in case of differences.
Governor regards this as very important, as, if agreement can be reached to have
authoritative Boundary Commission on the lines suggested, there is prospect of
obtaining boundary which would command international acceptance. Governor
regards it as impossible to consider concessions in respect to Wa States boundary
till the basis for concession has been ascertained, and suggests that consideration of
mutual concessions to be made should be subsequent to the definite fixation of the
Convention boundary line. Governor sees no objection to agreeing now to
subsequent negotiations for suitable adjustment, based on the spirit of mutual
compromise, if this would help to induce Chinese Government to agree to fixation
of boundary by Commission on the lines suggested above.
4. Only mutual concessions which the Governor can think of would be to
obtain the Chinese Government's acceptance of de facto boundary, north of latitude
25° 35' , in exchange for concessions in Wa States to cover the Chinese encroach
ments. Admittedly the Scott Line is the best, in fact, only really satisfactory
boundary. Salween was rejected as the boundary in 1889 and it is impossible
now to cede to China Panglong, Yungpang and other friendly States. Liuchen
Line is not boundary, but merely impalpable line which would make administration
impossible. It is also practically the line of the forged Hsueh map indignantly
repudiated by us in 1900.
Concessions offered and subsequently withdrawn by Scott seem unlikely to be
considered sufficient, and there are obvious objections to excluding the portions of