‘Koweit [Kuwait]. A report compiled in the Intelligence Branch, Quarter Master General’s Department’ [‎22] (38/66)

22
The Sheikh considers Jehara as essential to Koweit, as being
the only locality with any agricultural capabilities or resources.
Besides being a valuable source of supply, of grain, forage, dates,
etc., it is the favourite grazing ground,* in the winter months, of
Bedouin tribes who acknowledge Mubarak's rule, Even a tem
porary evacuation of this place would entail a great loss of pres
tige, and apart from permanent damage which might be done
toVate trees, etc., the Bedouin tribes would certainly go over
to any enemy of Mubarak's who occupied Jehara.
In short, the Sheikh is very far from regarding Jehara as a
mere dependency of Koweit; and expressed the strongest aver
sion to evacuating it, in order to withdraw his troops in time for
an effective defence of Koweit itself. He even maintained
that if Jehara were evacuated, even temporarily, Koweit itself
alone would be valueless to him. With some astuteness, he
pointed out that if Jehara were abandoned, it would imply
the occupation of Kathama also, i.e., the point supposed to be
selected for the terminus of the proposed German railway.
This attitude of the Sheikh, as to the extreme importance
of Jehara, was first clearly indicated at an interview at which I
was fortunate enough to be present. His view appears to
be not altogether unreasonable, and is one of considerable
importance in connection with the problem of the defence of
Koweit territory, as a whole, and of the nature of the support
necessary to maintain its integrity.
Unfortunately, for the Sheikh, Jehara would be untenable in
the event of a deliberate attack being delivered, by a force in
possession of artillery, unless its defence was undertaken on a
larger scale than appears probable under present circumstances.
No defence of the village could be satisfactory unless the Al-
Aghthi line of hills to the north-west were occupied; as from
these heights there is entire command over Jehara at a range of
4,000—5,000 yards. Owing to the shoal nature of this head of
the bay, it would be impossible for any fleet to effectively aid
the defence; the range would not be less than 5 : ooo yards.
Even if the attack were made by Arabs unprovided with artil
lery, the effect of fire from ships could hardly be more than
"moral," at most; and owing to the entirely open and level
desert country, the attack might be made from any direction ;
if from the south-west, besides threatening the communica
tions of Jehara with Koweit, the attacking force would avoid
coming under naval fire at all.
On the other hand, Jehara is on the direct road, from Basrah to
Koweit, and it might, in conceivable circumstances, be advisable
to occupy and hold Jehara for a time. But in this case the
danger would be that an untrained Arab garrison might probably
* Colonel Pelly (1866) alludes to the " fine pasturage grounds between Zobeir,
Jehara, and the Shatt -el -Arah."