'File No: E.7. Qatar & Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913' [‎51r] (118/460)

No. Cf.-203 (Confidential), dated Bushire, tlie 1st September 1914.
From— Major S. G. Knox , C .I.E., Officiating Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
To—The Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Z. Cox, K.C.I.E., C .S .T., Foreign
Secretary to the Govtrnment of India, Foreign and Political Department,
Simla.
I have the honour to invite a reference to correspondence ending with my letter
No. Cf. 52, dated 21st July 1914, on the subject of a proposed treaty with Shaikh
Abdullah bin Jasim bin Thani.
In my telegram No. 1042, dated 30th August 1914,1 informed you, Sir, of the
satisfactory reply that had been received from Shaikh Abdullah in reply to the
letter in which I announced to him that war had broken out between Great
Britain and Germany.
The value of that telegram is however, to some extent, discounted by reports
received by last mail from the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Bahrain, who derives his infomation
mainly from Khan Maeb Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo. He has also had the
advantage of recently discussing the situation with Shaikh Khalid bin
Muhammad bin Thani.
The reports of Khan Saheb Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo undoubtedly show that
disunion reigns among the members of the Bin Thani family, and that Shaikh
Abdullah bin Jasim has some difficulty in holding his own. He seems to be far more
tractable than the remaining members of the family, and, theoretically at all events,
holds views as to the maintenance of order, equality of all before the Shara' Law
and general justice which seem to mark him out as the man for our purposes. But
the difficulties of his position, which he would, it might be hoped, surmount
if left alone, are greatly enhanced by the tendency to intrigue with Bin Sa'ud,
shown by Shaikh Khalifah bin Jasim bin Thani. The Amir would be no Arab
if he did not welcome the opportunity of increasing his territory and influence and
the outlook for the independence of Katar is gloomy, unless we can arrange to
bolster up the authority of the Shaikh. The Turks would no doubt view with
satisfaction Bin Sa'ud's advance along the coast line hoping, not without some show
of reason, that it would embroil him with us. The result might be to throw Bin
Sa'ud still more under Turkish influence or to weaken his prestige and authority.
In either case, the Turk, who loves fishing in troubled waters, would think he stood
to gain.
Again, if Katar should fall into the hands of Bin Sa'ud, the consequence for the
Trucial Chiefs, commencing with Abu Dthabi, are bound to be most serious. They
have been severely scourged this year by the ravages of plague and, on the top
of that, comes financial ruin, caused by this most disastrous war now raging in
Europe.
The only remedy for this state of affairs would appear to be, as has been already
stated, an attempt to preserve Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim bin Thani and show, in
good time, by marks of our favour towards him, to Bin Sa'ud that he must reckon
on our strong opposition' in the event of any intrigues tending to undermine the
position of our prestige. I have been warned by Khan Saheb Yusuf bin Ahmad
Kanoo that any attempt at a treaty with Abdullah bin Jasim bin Thani alone must
be kept secret, as otherwise the Shaikh runs great danger of assassination or, at
least, of being ousted by combination of his relatives against him on the charge
of selling his country and their rights to the British. The fact that such an
accusation is absurd and rests on no foundation does not make it harder for an
Arab to believe.
We are therefore faced with a small problem of considerable difficulty. The
solution appears to me to lie in support, as strong as w T e can make it, of Shaikh
Abdullah without for the present asking for any return and trusting to the future
to bring us our reward. And here the personal factor comes into play whether
Shaikh Abdullah is worth support. I have already mentioned that he appears
tractable and well intentioned. The next question •—and a most important one
for us—is whether he is strong and will be able to make a good use of such aid as we
shall give him. Will he be Shaikh Mubarak or Shaikh Isa ? I am afraid that
I must here plead guilty to absolute ignorance of his character and, as lam not