'File 73/7 I (D 19) Status of Kuwait & Baghdad Railway, and Anglo-Turkish negotiations 1911' [‎53r] (120/631)

X
i
Vw"
- V-
T
1
Ul"
! MR, LYNCH ON THE BAGHDAD
, ' railway. .. ;
" ■ qi .11 . \V
the MttM, lAim-be,- cf m Torth^My
lie mm there is'a tim«ljr artiolB b f Mr F H n
Lynch on the political and comrm'rcfai btearin^"
ot the Baghdad RaShvaj Aft,,- .glantdn" al
the portion that rims throligh the : Highlands
of Asia Minor and the prospects of German ^
tinu neilt in <)lie3e Mri - Lynch' eon'-
When the railway,^according to the intentions
or fts pron>')tere, shclli hfeve em'e^dd frojn the
passes and valleys of the .^reaf monntain
barrier which conftner^e Atntolian plateau on
the sonth-east, we are-at-onee faue to faceMth
the political question; hi -the neigh^onrhood
ot Aleppo, at the littl/e toivn of Killis, - the - line
is.to enter the vast MesopoEarnian plain' which
i t will never leave until it rea -hm • the Persian
But a bratich ot it is destined* to be
taken to Aleppo, where it will join the
existing: -railway from Aleppo to Damasbus.
At a pliioo called Kayak just' before reach-
mg-Damascus, it will break off in a south
westerly diTeetion, and-proceed sci'al dit to
the' Egyptian frontier. U'his extensfon ' -is"
marked in the files-of the - Ministry tof •' Public
Works at Constantinople' h e-ite.pr&n'm
mMiatenvent —for immediate execution and it
is coloured red iri the railway map of this De
partment, which lies before me. : The 'railway •
will, therefore, have two great arms' <livei"^in^
at Killis. One will stretch straight to"tho"
Egyptian frontier, while the -other will extend
through Mosul and Baghda 1- to tue Persian
( t ulf, Thus the Railway is" plainly designed ta
hold asin a vice all the country lying between •
the Syrian toast- on the one side and the Persian-
Gulf on the other. ' ; ■ .
An independent American -w-riter. Captain
Mahan. has succeeded, by f his "cogent and
luminous itianaein dVivin^ hom-e the true
bearing upon world : politics of control by-
an Eitropean" Po wer ■inirnrcal to Ertghmd • of
these particular regions. Assuming that they
may Schne ' day be crossed by a Hail way
which' will at once assume political, an i,
therefore, strategic, importaneev-he proceeds^
to showttrat the wntinuanee'of Egypt in its
•/resent tenure and the security of the shortest
route tovbha East, both depend ultimately upon
their permanent political bias. He imagines d con -
ditlon of affairs when, in place of the existing
misrule, they might be developed by a modern
state. In the presence of such a state Egypt
would be insecure,and the communications of
the West with India, the Far East and, Austra
lia. woald be placed in jeopardy.*
It would, indeed, be strange if such
considerations as these had escaped the
attention . of those who inform and direct
the public opinion of Germany. There can
be no doubt that behind this railway lie,
political motives and ambitious which its pro
moters do not even take the trouble to conceal
when appealing to German sentiment ft may
be truly said that, throughout the develop-
ment of the enterprise, its supporters have
spoken with two voices and in two keys. When
looking for foreign capital, they lay stress upon
its purely Commercial nature;' but when
they endeavour to enlist on its side the
weight of German public opinion., tfye
key is raised, the voice changes and the
emphasis falls upon the far-reaching beae-
fits in the domain of .world policy" which
the realisation of the scheme is destined to
achieve for - the German Fatherland. I have
before me the new and revised edition of Dr.
Rohrbach's monograph upon the Baghdad raii-
wav. The writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. is not only a careful student
of foreign politics, whose works arc extensively '
read in Germany/but he has taken the trouble
thoroughly to familiarise himself with his'
sub je"Ct in four successive journeys to the' re^i ns '
which f he ra'il way is destine J to cross'. lie imiiies
no secret of its political importance, i^jltolje'
tiiaJrumi) card in the hand of Gemiany in a
n os&i iTe connict witTr7?ii*j'lana. ,
"One factor anU oneaidne will detenu me the
possibility of a suecessful issue for - Germany iu
such a conflict, whether or not we .-.succeed in
placing .England in a perilous position. A direct
attack upon EagL-md across the North Set is
out of the question; the prospect of a German
invasion of Englmd is a fantastic-' dream.-
it is necessary to discover ahbthet- com
bination in order to hit England in a vulnerable
spot—rm.'? here we come tu th" (joint where the rela
tionship of Germany to, Turkey and the condition*
prerftiUny in Turkey become of (lan-ice . uaportarice
for German fpreujn policy, hastd at it now is upon
witchfulnesi in the direction of livtjlaud. . ...
be attacked and mortally wound-
from Europe only in one place
England can
ed by land
Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for
England not onl^ the end. of her dominion over
the Suez Canal and of her connections with
India and the Far East, but would probably
entail the loss also ot her posses--io(is in Central
an i Ivist, Africa. 1 he conquest of' Egypt by a
Mahomed m Power, like Turkey, would also im
peril England's hold over her (5) iuillion Maho-
medan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her
relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey,
however, can never dream of recoveving Egv pt
until .she is ^mistress of a developed I'aiP.vay
system iu Asia Minor and Syria, ani until,
through the progress of the Anatolian Railwav
to Baghdad, she is in a position to withstand
an attack by England, upon Mesopotamia The
Turkish " rmy must lie increased and improved,
and progress must be made in her economic
and financial position . . , The stronger Turkey
grows, the more dangerous does she become for
England , .. Egypt is a prize which for Tur
key would be well worth the risk of takingsides
with Germany in a war with England Tlx-
* Mahan,: The Pto'iletn of Asia, pp.- < i - 's«q. T ~
f Kohrla '-h. Die Baffodb.ihn,, Berlin,
policy of ^ro^ocAmy Turkey,tMtbfi k~no»pinm*lh}/
ffermany, has no other oh ^ct, but th e iesire to effect
an insurance ay xinst \ire'danger of a i vanJ unhh
Eryhndft f t i CtiC-
' The italics in this interesting passage afS^not
min-e, butifch(?ae of Dr. k -.Hohcbaclit Even Pro■<
fe$sor i>olbrtielc, wiio seeks ■'to lulJ our fears,
adgnifcs that Germany ^ mighty perhaps In -com- ■
binat-ion withthe Turks, attack the English in
i Egypt."' Qffioial - Germany, of eourse, denies
such ulterior designs. But even the utterances
of official Germany.; "have: -changed, in tono sirK.e
the Baghdad railway was discussed-i-nthe British
House of Commons in the spring of ii903 4 (ha
that occasion Mr. iialfou-rt presumably prompted
by. the Germans: Government, repeatedly re
pudiated the suggestion made in the debate that
the enteA'prise was a German project. jTh©
repudiation would Sound strange at the
pr^spnt.day. tPotsdam hag dispelled whatever
•illusioasr son that ■ (point might .preyionsfly
have . been entertained, it, f«M t+) ranEiberal
^tate^man,!Lordv then ianal; Edmund, Eitznmu-
ricp, toi express the-better informed view.
" V\ hat," he isaid, "makes the House take a
real live interest in th*3 qnestion is the feeling'
that-itHHind up Ayith the future of this railway
therevis probably the future political control
of large regions of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia,
and the . Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. "
• The commercial prospects. Mr. Lynch -opines,
vtould have no vast interest for Germany but
for the vast political project that looms behind.
Of'thiS' he eoritihud's T—
Abdul H aipid lias gone, but the German Am-
bassado'r r.etnains, ami he happens to be one" of
the ablest in en of the day. When the Uevulu-
tioh trausforined the political situation in
Turkey, the young Turks counneuced their
reign under the iiilluence of a convic
tion that, ^ if Turlfey could hppe-to re •
cjovei- a place aanpng the nations, there
must he a complete break, witji Ilamidian
' ta-aditions. Those were briet' moments, full of
hope and even of expectation ; and, difficult, of
realisation as such ideajs no doiibi; we're, they
Were not, and aye still not, impracticable. But
these mdments Were certainly b^ief. They have
been succeeded by a different temper^ both in
the dorhain of .doipestic and foreign politics.
(Jevhian counsels are- sixain s^preuie r in Cons
tantinople, Wiiat rt'ould seem to be
the guiding principles of Turkish policy at
th^ present time ? A strong arnij is to , be
c'oiiside.re.d jis the first ne^d. ef the nation, its
requirement's being met- by large ipans in
its cohesive puss against any extertal^ fe
' What i^ tills but a Prussian conception '-' lit
Turkey is 'not, "Brussia, and this is a palic
v^hicli in. her 'case leads straight to ,nation;
-Irphs. The men of iron are to cement the
Empire together, and are then to direct
its'cohesive. huss against any extertaf fee"
policy
national
rum and "a. foreign protectorate, Methods,
wholly different'are required in the case of
Turkey to weld together the di|t'ereuf elements
of the population- At the same time one can
understand the strength of the appeal which
a miltary policy'such as I- have described is
calculated to present to the members of the
dominant race. It flatters tlifeir pride, and is
conforV^'e to all their prejudices. Patient
devotuoft to elememtary administrative and
economic mirsaits is not, perhaps, exactly on
a level witli the flights of Oriental imagioation.