'File 73/7 I (D 19) Status of Kuwait & Baghdad Railway, and Anglo-Turkish negotiations 1911' [‎21r] (59/631)

Turkish friendship), because he owns date
groves near tao, in Turkish territory, which
bring bim in £4,000 a year. He therefore thinks
it policy to have a foot in each camp. He
gladlj' seeks the aid of British bluejackets
when bis capital is menaced, but he flies the
lurkish flag as a cheap and meaningless com
pliment. There is no doubt about" the flag,
tor when he received me a huge Crescent and
fe ar was flymg over his house. His own explana
tion, though not made to me, was that be
new it because it was the emblem of the Musul-
man faith ; and, further, that when his ships
f S1 iV. r) f ei S n harbours, it was a convenience
or xern to carry a flag which was known and
recognized. It is probable that the custom is
really a survival of the days when the vessels
ot ivoweit sailed forth to pro ect Basra from the
delta 01 P rodator y tribes of the Euphrates
It is perhaps doubtful whether Ivoweit will
T T ^ 0m * the commercial terminus of the
-Baghdad Railway. That destiny may be
! reserved for Basra, and the bar at the mouth of
tne bhatt-al-Arab can bo easily dredged. But
; even under the new dispensation Turkey has
! not erased to make advances, sometimes cordial,
sometimes menacing, to Koweit. In 1909
pressure was placed upon Mubarak by the
cancellation, on the pretext that he was "not a
i urkish subject, of large purchases of land which
ne had made in Mesopotamia.
Attempts to Seize Koweit. (aw
. : ' 1 e Lord Curzon was Viceroy Turkish
mtngues, by direction of Abdul Hamid and
| ns is believed, at the instigation of Germany,
ri a ^ more definite shape. In 1900
uborak, who lias great influence with the
j fillers ot Central Arabia, plunged boldly into the
rivalry between the great families of Ibn
Kashid and Ibn Saud, and led an army into the
j interior. He was marching to the support
ot - bu baud, and after more than one victory
was ambushed in a ravine, and so badly de-
ed that when the remnants of his force
returned to Ivoweit, some of his men were rid-
mg three on a horse. Abdul Hamid inune-
aiately took advantage of Mubarak's plight,
in 1901 a decrepit Turkish corvette, packed with
troops, steamed into Koweit harbour, and its
commander blandly prepared to take possession
of the town. Lord Curzon was fully acquainted
with the projected plot, and, with the sanction
oi the Home Government, had issued explicit
directions to the British naval authorities to
prevent the seizure of Koweit, The corvette
found the inevitable British cruiser awaiting
her. and a British naval officer. Captain Pears,
said a few plain words which induced the Turks
to withdraw in considerable haste. The Turkish
Government afterwards bad the effrontery to
inform the Foreign Office that the vessel carried
no troops at all. Towards the end of the year
the corvette reappeared, bearing a high Turkish
official, who carried an extremely threatening
message from the Sultan to Mubarak.
On that occasion another British naval
officer,^ Captain Simons, whose ship was
at Koweit, intervened upon his own
responsibility—for instructions had not
reached bim—and at bis bidding Mubarak
ordered the Sultan's envoy to depart.
The Turks were not deterred from ma; 'ng
mischief, although twice driven back by the
sight of British guns. They incited Ibn
Kasbid to move on Koweit, which he did with
great alacrity. The close of the year found
throe British warships in the harbour, a British
force with light guns in the fort of Jehara
18 miles inland, and British bluejackets manning
hastily-prepared entrenchments outside the
town. Clouds of Ibn Rashid's horsemen
hovered near for some time, but the task was
too formidable for them, and eventually they
marched back to Central Arabia. The last
definite attempt to seize Koweit was made some
months later by Mubarak's nephews, assuredly
with Turkish cognisance. They left the Shatt-
al-Arab, where they were in exile, with a fleet
of boats, which was promptly chased and dis
persed by bis Majesty's ship Lapwing.
j r . KHOKABn™ A HAXI>Br;BI YA X.
1 bo next Turkish move was more iAr iffT.,
I Almost before the menace of Ibn RashVd Wl
bSrr 4 maM f<>rces of
ft territory
oia»-k tt U ho rnrks occupied Safwan and
i month'Lter^thev
miles south of Koweit at ih* fiT
(rpmii-.r 4. ^ tne southern ex-
renntj ot the territories claimed by Mubarilr
I ho reason of this renewed activity probablv
was that it had been discovered that the deeo
narrow inlets of Khor Abdullah and Kbor
fohoir at the bock of Bubuan island, mUht
form alternative termini for the Baghdad Rail
Si th« 1S f 0 T n t ha ] t Lord Curzon, who exer-
thT hoad of^thp ance regarding affairs at
ne nc^ict ox the Gull, protested very stronclv
RnTTi rp es f. t cts of unprovoked aggression
But the 1 urkish outposts remained long after
I his fleparture. and, I understand, are still there
' mPnf C H n i 0n % "Ssumed that the Home Govern-
i ion. M T S V. PP0r ^ the Vi ceroy's representa-
i Mubarak made an ineffectual response
i by sending a small force to occupy Hatraiii
at the northern extremity of the Bay of Koweit'
close by the entrance to the Khor Sabivn'
t"^? ' 1S Sai( ii, to lmvo informed the Porte
that Mubarak s rights are not regarded as nre-
juc iced by the Turkish occupation, but the
reluctance oi the Foreign Office to interfere
is not m accord with the definite though
fnTsSd. Pr0mi3eS which we mttde ^ Mubarak
Mubarak's Present Position.
Kevertheiess, Mubarak is far stronger now
than he has ever been. Koweit is growing
rapidly, and has spread far outside its old walls
lis tiade is steadily increasing, and the Sheikh
is waxing rich. He is reputed to be able to
f , | ut between 10 000 and 15,000 fighting men in
the field. He has bought a yacht, and often
goes to stay with Sheikh Kbazaal, the powerful
Arab ruler ot Mohammerah, in Persia, with
whom he is on excellent terms. When Lord
Curzon visited him and gave him a sword of
honour, he described himself as having become
a military officer of the British Empire." It
may have been a phrase more suitable for
the languorous Orient's jewelled ear." but it
was probably sincerely meant. The future of
Koweit is by no means free from uncertainty
and we cannot afford to relax the watch we
ruamtam over it.