'Foreign Office Memorandum on Arabian Policy.' [‎10r] (19/20)

innocuous large Turkish forces, and greatly facilitated our task in keeping open to
traffic the Ked Sea.
It may be said with some show of justice that they have had their reward in
gaining their independence and freeing themselves from the Turkish yoke, but the
fact must not be lost sight of that, with the removal of the dominant influence, the
Arabian Peninsula was left without administrative and financial means or experi
ence for the preservation of order and for the substitution of effective local government
in place of what had existed previously.
This applies in particular to the Hejaz, and I cannot refrain from thinking that
the promises made by His Majesty's Government impose a certain moral obligation to
ensure that the future of these countries is at least as prosperous as their past.
I do not, however, wish to press unduly this point, since sentimental considera
tions must give way to those of economy at the present time, and I will pass on to the
more practical aspects of the case.
As your Lordship is aware, the Arab revolt was not regarded with sympathy
either in India or in our other Mahommedan countries. This feeling itill exists
to-day. The revolt can only be justified by its success, and we shall undoubtedly lay
ourselves open to severe criticism if the Peninsula passes into a state of anarchy.
Further than this, the Allied policy with regard to Syria and Palestine is not
in accord with the wishes of the local populations, and has already exposed His
Majesty s Government to a charge of breach of promise and opened the field to
Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda from the north.
The situation in the Middle East to-day gives rise to grave misgivings, and
seems unlikely to improve in the near future. On this account I consider it is of
great importance that, if we gain a special position in the Arabian Peninsula, His
Majesty's Government should so employ it as to earn the gratitude of the people and
silence the criticism of those detractors, who accuse us of cynicism and self-interest
in our treatment of the Arabs.
At the present moment we are in a favourable position to achieve this, since the
factors which have rendered so restless the Arabs in Syria and Mesopotamia have not
operated with any great force in the Peninsula itself, and its rulers, with the excep-
tron of the Imam Yahya and the new Emir of Hail, who has in point of fact come
under the influence of Ibn Saud, have given satisfactory proofs that they are prepared
to look to us for help and guidance and protection.
The questions then arise whether we can gain our object without payment, and,
if not, whether the results achieved will justify the expenditure.
As regards the former point I consider that the experience of the last four years
shows the answer to be emphatically in the negative. I do not advocate any undue
interference in the internal and local affairs of the Peninsula, but I presume that we
shall attempt to adjust the relations between the different rulers and claim to influence
all foreign relations, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the rulers will require
some quid fro quo. Furthermore, moral influence has its effect in the East, but it
will not always prove such a strong deterrent as the threat to cut off supplies, more
especially in countries which are far removed from civilisation and where it is
impossible to achieve a purpose by armed force.
I do not think it is too much to say that if we attempt to gain a predominant
influence in Arabia without being prepared to pay for it our efforts will result in
failure.
As regards the advantages to be gained, I place, first and foremost, the chance
of recovering and maintaining our prestige in the Middle East.
We have destroyed the Power which, however badly, ruled Arabia. We must
put something in its place, and, in so doing, endeavour to re-establish our good name
for disinterestedness and sympathy with Moslem races. We are, and shall continue
to be, hampered in Syria and Palestine. It is, therefore, the more necessary to seize
our opportunity in the Peninsula where the conditions are favourable and where we
shall not be exposed to foreign rivalry once our special position is recognised.
Secondly, there is considerable evrdenqe to show that a determined effort is being
made to unite Islam against all European" Powers. A friendly Arabia will be an
important check to this.
Thirdly, it is necessary to have a friendly population in the countries bordering
our vital sea routes.
Equal to these in importance is the necessity ot keeping open the pilgrimage
routes to the Holy Places and of ensuring that the pilgrimage itself is undertaken.
We are under judgment of the Moslems in all parts of the world in this matter,
and failure will do us incalculable harm.