'File 14/115 VII Annex (B 9) Abu Musa oxide: collected background material on the case' [‎131v] (273/1904)

16
This argument has all been stated before, and it seems superfluous for me to go
over the ground again.
(49)** The (British) memorandum starts f rom, the assumption that Hasan Sam-
aiyeh's proceedings were culpable. —Yes this is so. The German quotation, vv ic
follows, of the argutnent of the British memorandum is not quite a correct one.
The argument of the British memorandum was that ^ there is nothing m the docu
ments in possession of His Majesty 's Government to indicate that Hasan bamaiyela
occupied the post of the managing partner and that there was every reason to be
lieve that in any case any authority he had did not extend to tne grant ox su^n a
contract as this (which tied the hands of the Company for an inaefimte penou;
without first consulting the partners.
(50) The Imperial Government, however, maintain that the partners did, as a matter
of fact, sanction the agreement between Hasan Samaiyeh and If onckJiaus, hut this sanc
tion was not really necessary as Hasan Samaiyeh is the manager of the Company.— Jur
reply to this has been (i) that Hasan is proved to have deliberately misled the part~
ners as to the nature of the contract and withheld the text from them, and (u) that
their sanction was necessary,
Hasan bad nothing else to work on by way of authority than the conojtion laid
down in the document admitting Nakhoda Ali to partnership (Enclosure i to Jnrst
German Memorandum). It is shown in item 33, that the ivlemorahduin ot A sd O -
ciation (Annex 14 of Gexman rejoinder), was never signed up and never be
came operative, and that the concern was being workeo. on the conditions prescribed
in Enclosure 2 above mentioned.
Furthermore, it will be noted that Hasan Samaiyeh never attempted to contend
that he was under no obligation to consult the partners, but that he had consulted
them and that they had approved—the fact being that when communicating wita
them he had deliberately withheld the text and the important feature, in tne
contract to which he knew perfectly well they would object. His lettei^to ileje^
(Annexes 24 to 27) show clearly that on ordinary occasions ue did feel under uhe
obligation to consult the partners, and that Nejef demurred to his failure to do so
in this case.
It is disputed that Nejef was a ** This was
connected with personal services and, therefore
ewd—TMs conclusion is not demonstrated by the documents quoted.
The subsidiary deed admitting ISiakhoda Ali as a partner in expenditure
and profits of the Company makes no such suggestion, but on the contrary clearly
places Nakhoda Ali (among the partners inter in precisely the same position as
his fellows. Nor can the question, or rather the answer, be begged from the dis-
ino-enuous querv and suggestion made in Aboul lj<yif s letter to xlasan oi i^'lrd June
1905 (German Annex 32). Abdul Latif himself states that Hasan's reply to that
letter indicated that they did recognise Nejef and that he therefore dropped the
suggestion.
(52) This view {thai Nejef was not a partner)
dullah and the former energetically denied to t Bmavre
had ever recognised Nejef as a partner.—1 have a considerable number ot letters from
Hasan and Abdullah to Nejef, of which I submit a selection (Annexes 24 to .30),
which give the lie to the above denial and conclusively show that they both recog
nised Nejef as having donned his father's mantle, as a partner in the Company.
(53)**He (Nejej) said to Abdullah, son of
Draqoman of the Imperial Vice-Consulate at Bushire, that
aareement withWonchhaus, (vide also the note to this passage).—Eeliance can
neither be placed on the statements of Abdullah bin Hasan nor on those of the then
Dragoman of the Imperial German Vice-Consulate (since dismissed).
As regards the declaration of the British subject Brown that Nejef expressed
aim-oval of the contract and offered to sell his share, this being a retraction of what
he stated in his petition to Lieutenant Gabriel on 16th February 1908, I can oniy