'Muscat Rising, from April 1917 to January 1918 & resumed from April 1920 to Oct 1920' [‎93r] (196/558)

3
the British Gcvernment was mooted several times in the time of the Sultan's
father Saiyid Faisal who always had a strong objection to such an idea and
Saiyid Taimur has inherited this objection. It will be seen that my suggestion
is a different one: I do not propose that we should farm the Customs
guaranteeing the Sultan a fixed sum but that we should lend him servants
whom he will employ.
20. I have already explained officially his financial system which, with
hjs indebtedness hangs like a millstone round his neck and prevents any
improvement in his administration.
21. The Sultan agrees to get rid of his useless guards and replace them
by a regiment under British officers, but I have explained to him that I could
not recommend this to my Government for their approval unless he was also
prepared to make the necessary improvement in his financial administration.
22. While we could ensure the payment of troops from the subsidies
which we pay him there would appear to be little use in perpetuating the
present condition of chaos which will continue to give us further trouble in the
future.
23. In the course of these discussions with the Sultan I have explained
to him that the only method by which he can pay off his debts is by floating
a loan in the form of a national debt. I have said that I thought that it
would be possible to obtain the five lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees of rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. he would require from
Banks in India. He asked me whether I thought that Government would
be guarantee for him in such a loan to which I replied that without asking I
could not say, but that I saw no reason why they should refuse provided he
agreed to place his Customs on a sound basis. He then asked me what
amount of interference this would entail as his people would be touchy on the
subject.
24. Having thus explained the conversations which I have had with
His Highness which he is aware are only an attempt to clear the air and have
no official value unless they are put upon an official basis I will come to tha
suggestions which I venture to make.
25. The Maskat question can be divided into two parts—
Firstly, that which affects Oman proper over which the Sultans have
had but a weak and intermittent authority though they have at
times maintained Governors at such places as Nizweh and Zikki.
On the other hand a large portion of the customs revenues is levied on
goods being despatched to and from this territory.
Secondly, that which refers to the coastal region and the valleys con
nected with it over which the ruler's authority has been complete.
Of this territory the valuable valley of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Semail and
the district and town of Nakhl are in the hands of the enemy.
For the moment the question of Oman proper can be left oyer as it is
evident that nothing can be done until either a meeting can be
held with the rebels or other measures taken.
With regard to division number two it is otherwise since, thanks to
the regiment stationed at Maskat, this territory is, with the
exceptions named, under the authority of the Sultan.
26. The proposals 1 would make may be summarised under three head
ings—
(1) Military.
(2) Administration.
(3) Education.
The third heading may at first sight appear to be going ahead of the situation
but in actual fact it is a necessary part of the programme and in any case is
a simple matter.
27. Military.—It has been shown that until the Sultan has some force
with which to govern his position will be an impossible one. Since however
he has agreed to the raising of a force under British officers it only remains
should the Government of India agree to the idea in principle—to determine
what character the force should take.