'Muscat Rising, from April 1917 to January 1918 & resumed from April 1920 to Oct 1920' [‎92r] (194/558)

9. My object in having a meeting with Shaikh Isa was two-fold. I
desired to see if some modus vivendi could be arrived at, but failing this I
wished to determine definitely what were the irreconcilable points of difference
between the two parties. The ignorance of the country Arab needs to be met
with to be realised and I had hoped that, by telling Isa, with the prestige of:
the British Government to back the statement, how far he was asking that .
which was impossible and how far he would have to revise his demands, I
should have got the differences to a clear issue. The meeting would have
cleared the air and we should have seen if, as the Sultan believes, a show of
force were the only means by which the deadlock could be ended.
10. This result will however be better attained when the Sultan has
some counters to stake in the game.
11. As things are at present when the Sultan refers to force his reference
is to force supplied by His Majesty's Government which is to replace him in
power. He has already used what power he possesses without any result
beyond showing his absolute weakness and the unreliability of the tribes
upon whom he depended.
12. Now supposing that, at the close of the war. Government were
disposed to assent to his recent request for military assistance and to under
take an expedition on his behalf such a proceeding would be, in present
circumstances, a waste of men and of money. As to-day, if we were to with
draw our regiment, the Sultan would speedily be deposed by the rebel party
so, on our withdrawing our expedition, having no force with which to
maintain himself, he would rapidly be in the same position as in the past.
13. On the other hand, it is certain that His Majesty's Government
cannot view with equanimity the prospect of the permanent garrisoning of
Maskat.
14. (Apart from the question of the loss of a regiment which could well
be employed elsewhere the expense entailed is out of all proportion to the
result obtained. We are spending on Maskat annually a sum which the
finances of Maskat could at no time entertain.)
15. The first necessity, then, is, evidently, to provide the. Sultan with a
force which he can afford to maintain and which will enable him to speak
with some authority and thus to put him in a position in which he will be
Sultan in more than name.
16. I calculate that, at present, his Arab guards in Maskat and Muttra,
his Baluch levies and his other guards at Sur, Sohar Khaburah, Barka, Sib, &c.,
cost him no less a sum than two-and-a-half lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees of rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. per annum. Iheso
guards for whom he pays are, in actual fact, only partly in existence a fact of
which he is thoroughly aware—and in so far as they do exist they are of no
military value. They support the Walis in their Government and assist in
recovering such Customs dues as are recovered by providing the necessary
show of force; but when any military measures are required the Sultan has
been obliged to purchase the assistance of his Shaikhs who, knowing his
weakness, have bled him freely and have deserted him when it came to the
matter of fighting.
17. I have explained to the Sultan that the only hope I can see for him
is to revise his administration thoroughly, both military and civil; I have told
him that I should strongly advise him to raise a force under British omcers
and to place his Customs under trained officials from India or from Egypt.
18. He said that he had already agreed to the first in Colonel Bann's
time and that he was ready to have a force raised which should be entirely
under the control of the British officers in charge of it, but he demurred to my
second suggestion and said that he would see if he coUid not first put matters
right on his own system but that if he could not do so he would come to ma.
19. I told him that it was a matter for himself to decide but that;
personailv I had no doubt that he could not do it on his present system and
that in the end he would be obliged to ask for assistance from us, always
provided Government would approve of the idea and would agree to supply
the officers suggested. The question of the taking over of the Customs by