'Summary of the Hejaz Revolt' [‎87r] (25/30)

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17. At the beginning'of Juuo, Fakhri reported that the supplies of the 2nd Composite Force and the
P 17. Expi'diti.jtiary B^orce would be exhausted, at the end of June and dtdy respectively, while tin-
.Ni .ma dare crop (known to Bo a built 2,000,000 kilos) would not he available until September^
1«. At the l>e<i-inniug- of July, when reporting the evacnation of Mudowcre to Damascus, Fakhri
explaifijpd that, in his opinion, the low morale of the troops, which could alone account for such infainou .s
conduct, was du^ primarily to ilie non-arrival of rcinfoi^-i-nicnts and to the iailure of the Turkish Higher
Command\o reopen railway communication between the Hejaz fixfjedifcionary Force and the north,
iy. A hi ':i r tlie samw datw, Fakhri reported that it was hi.s opinion that the Medina foroe might just bold
out to ilit- Iteginning of September (new date harvest), but he feared that the I'nd Composite ifotc# would be
■ wablo to da^so. He complaineil bitKn-ly of the fact that no attempt had yet been made to reopen his
< Miumimications with the north, and oouM only look forward to the future with the gravest anxietv.
At f,lie middle of duly, Fakhri was ordered to "take over with bis mounted troops the Maan—
Mudowere section of the railway, but refused on the grounds that no further reduction could be made with
safety, in the Medina garrison where his moijnted troops were his only, mobile reserve; that until the railway
was repaired mobile trciops could uot be maintained in the Maan—Mudowere area where, was neither water
nor grazing, and, lastly, that the anini;il> of these troops were earmarked as,Medina's last reserve of food.
2U On the 17th July, Fakhri made a strong appeal to Liman von Sanders, Oeneral Officer Commanding,
Yelderem, in the course of which he asked that the ilnd Army Corj)s should be temporarily put under his
| command, and that the Damascus line of communication railway transport, department and the Hejaz
railway administration shhiild be placed definitely and directly Under his orders, lie considered that only
by the prompt addpti-m of tfiese measures could the present very critical situation be saved, and was of
the opinion thai his force iiad baeq. disgracefully neglected.
22* At the beginning of August, Fakhri reported that the IJejaz Expeditionary Force were so short of
fuel that even if the railway was repaired it was doubtful if trains would get through to Medina.
23. On the l^th August. Kakhri despatched a message of farewell, as in view of the fall of Mudowere
(captured by two companits Imperial Camel Corps on tne 8tb August), he considered Medina doomed,
21. On the 11th August, the pmchasing officer of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force in Damascus received
orders (from Fakliri r) t<» close his accounts and make no farther purchases.
On the same day, Pakiiri wag very despondent of the situation of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, and
considered disaster was pending. This he attributed to shortage of fuel, slowness in repairing the railway
north of Maan, lack of decision regarding the Maan—Mudowere section, the fact that \elderem had omitted
to send reinforcements arid had not placed the llnd Army Corps under his orders, lack of barley, wheat and
money, and his inability to reinforce any of his garrisons to the north owing to shortage of troops in
Medina.
He considered that in the next few months no improvement was likely. The only mobile troops at his
disposal were a camel mounted regiment and machine-gun company (310 combatants and 292 camels) and a
mule mounted regiment ajud machine-gun company (195 coml>atants, 29 mules, 78 camels). J hese could not
be spared for duty north of Tel nk. as they were the only reserve leit for the Medina area. He preferred to
surrender or starve rather than be defeated by the Arabs at Medina.
The above message was apparently despatched to Enver Fa^ha, who replied sharing Fakhri's views on
the difficulty of the fleja? Expeditionary, Force undertaking active operations, and considered that the onus
of responsibility of reopening the railway was on Yelderem, and not the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, and
owing to the comparative calm on the Faiestiue fiont this should not be impossible.
& ■ '
ammmm
Gknkkal S TAFF,
31.^ August, 1918.
appendix n.
ENEMY CASUALTIES.
The following figure* of enemy casualties since the outbreak of the revolt up to the end of
August, 1918, we taken from various sources, but mainly based on Arab claims:—
———
KUled.
Wounded,
i . I
Prisoners.
■
4,697 I 871
Officers.
Rank and file.
Guns.
——
.Machine (runs.
230
8,919
50
59
v--
With reference to the number of prisoners captured, General Wingate reported that since the outbreak
of the revolt to the end of July, 1918, 5,827 prisoners of war had been sent from the Hejaz for internment
in Egypt. , . v j « *
The Arabs claim the following destruction to the railway line up to the end ot .ugust ;
Engines.
Trucks.
• - ■ . » , • j#.
15
■
—
Kails.
Bridges and culverts.
29 (?)
28,692
207