'Summary of the Hejaz Revolt' [‎79v] (10/30)

which is centred in Riadh, with the result that the Governor of Khurma had defected
to the W:iliabis. Hussein, at the instigation of Abdulla, despatched a punitive fen
to Khunna which was ignorainousJy defeated. Though it is not clearly established
that Ibn Saud, the Emir of Nejd, was directly responsible for the situation at Khurma,
Hussein's instinctive fear of his rival was sufficient to suggest Wahabi designs against
M.voa, HSssein feeling particularly vulnerable on account of the commitment of the
most efficient part of his forces to the north under Feisal. There is no doubt that at
this period the mind of King Hussein was in a thoroughly unsettled state, and
that the long, simmering trouble between him and Ibn Saud was on the point of
boiling over.
24. Letters from Ibn Rashid, interceinted by bedouins, showed that, although
he had reached Hail paragraph 20), |i© was unable, owing to British preeauti^nsj
to o!)tain supplies from Koweit. He complained bitterly of his treatment by the
Turkish otiicers. particularly by Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. . In reply to a letter sent to him by
Sh^riT At > l 1 ulla offering him good t reagent if he threw over the Turks, he expressed
his willingness to join the Sheritians, but asked for delay, probably with a view to
consulting the Turkish political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Abdul Hamid, who was en route to join him,
and to whom reference is made later, and in expectation of the arrival of his own agent;
Rashid Ibn Leilah, * from Damascus, with two guns and two machine guns,f presents
iVom the Turks. (His acrent was still m Damascus, July, 1918.) In the light of the
.ibove-mentioned situation at Khurma the motive underlying Abdulla's overtures
seenis rtrmarent.
25. On the 1st and 3rd July , Maan was bombed. On the 4th the Arabs attacked
Jeriun and the railway, damaging the latter, and took 13 prisoners, exclusive of a
Turkish picquet. On the 5tli, report® fr^tn Maan showed that there was no money
to purchasa supplies, the garrison had lived on indifferent rations for two months,
desertions, even among officers, had been frequent and animals were dying daily from
starvation. On the 6th, the town was again bombed, and Jerdun was bombed on the
Hth. On the 12th July it was reported that the railwav from the north had apparently
been repaired as far as liasa. and on the 14th orders were issued that repairs to the
north of Maan were to be effected bv removing rails from the line south of that place
(see note to paragraph 18), but it was not anticipated that it would be completed through
to Maan before the end of July.
26. On the 17th July a Turkish force, composed of two columns, concentrated at
Kutrani and Samra respectively, with the object of operating against an Arab detach
ment north-west of Kutrani. The Turks claimed to have encountered this force and to
have driven it southwards in disorder, but this was not confirmed. On this date the
food question at Maah was again reported to he critical ; rations and forage consumed
daily amounted to three tons, while the weekly convoys from Juruf rarely carried more
than nine tons. Ihe population had created disturbances and demanded to be allowed
to proceed to Damascus if food was unobtainable at Maan; the Sheikhs hai held a
meeting and passed a resolution deciding to co-operate w^th Feisal in the event of his
attacking the town. On the 21st the Arabs attacked the line between Jerdun and
Maan and held the line and its water supply up to the evening of the 23rd. The
enem} s loss was considerable. Their relief column advancing towards Jerdun was
engaged by the Arabs and forced to retire, though the Turks claimed to have inflicted
ieavy casualties on the Arabs (our official reports say 70), and themselves admitted to
11 killed and 20 wounded. The Maan transport animals which were at Jerdun at the
tone earrjing water and supplies, were all killed by shell fire, Maan thus being deprived
o trauspoft. On the 20th and 23rd Maan was again bombed.
27. In the southern Hejaz the Arabs destroved 250 rails, some bridges and
i Kftr ^- a L ^ orem ^ er ' 191 ^ when, as Ibn Rasbid's ag-ent, he visited Ajaimi es Saadun,
l-f' ' ' . 0 ' m> " in'^ish soldiers, and in December. 1910, purchased certain stores in Nejf, for winch
made l S a sa ^ e back to Hail through the tribes which lay on his road. He Y***
and the FtrW- 1 - ' • Ur i ir \ (<ruer to secur e his interest in their propaganda. He was all powerful at N.u
Dear llanv' ivnl'V ' U 1 Ue was present at the light between the Kashid-te and Sherital Ion ■-
at Medaiu .^i ^ l ^. ra l ),1 .' , )» although it is not certain if the Emir himself was present. He ar! 1 '
to Damaiicua >n ?Vi 10 ^ us ^' and shortly afterwards left for Constantinople and returnee
t Ni^Shaahn ^ th 1 if 18. where he still was at the beoinning of August,
the open on the Xu j lIn( '' i Inr ^hejkh of the Rualla (Anazah), is now believed to have definitely come mo
making-a "ood tliiix-- 1 ie '" a & a i cat the Turks. lie has until recently been sitting on the feuce an>
reported to hiive k contraband ('arayan traffic (see note to paragraph 1'J). Ue was reGent / ,
but would hold ui anv ^ 6 wou l >ass ^ashid Ibu Leiluh through his capital, Jauf, on the road to al >
1,01(1 UP ^ WiB or munitions of war accompanying' him: (See Appendix L.)