File E/8 I Ibn Sa‘ud [‎80r] (172/606)

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at Katif and should protect them ; and that he should communicale with the Poli
tical Agent at Bahrain regarding them should any questions arise.
11. In all the formal and private discussions which took place Bin Saud was
most friendly ; he seemed very much in earnest and most anxious to do whatever
he could to meet the wishes of Government and to obtain their support. We
repeatedly told him that the British Government could not give him any assurance
that they would keep the peace, as he expressed it, on the Hrsa coast; this of course
is what he wanted, but he realized that it was impossible. The tangible results
of our interviews with him were that he at once agreed to accept and protect British
traders in Katif (and no doubt in other places on the coast should they want to go
there) and to postpone making any settlement with the Tuiks until he marches
north.in the spring, i .e., for three months. Bin Saud also stated in a more ii formal
manner that he would not interfere in the politics of Katar and the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates.
states, and I think that Memorandum II shows that he has no desire to act con
trary to the wishes of Government in these regions. Further, ! am of opinion,
and Captain Shakespear shares my view, that there is not the slightest doubt that
should His Majesty's Government consider it desirable to use their good offices to
effect a settlement between Bin Saud and the Porte, by which he would remam
" de jure " ruler under Turkish suzerainty of the territories cf which he is at
present" de facto '' ruler. Bin Saud would be only too glad to make a formal arrange
ment with the British Government on the remainder of the four points men
tioned in Sir Percy Cox's memorandum, to co-opeiate in the suppression of
piracy and the arms traffic, and in the preservation of the Maritime Truce. In
connection with the Arms Traffic question I may mention that Bin Saud has made
an application to be allowed to import rifles for the use of his troops -.this is being
dealt with separately in my letter No. 806 of the 20th December 1913, but it shows,
I think, that Bin Saud means to work with the British Government in the matter.
12. In the course of our conversations with Bin Saud we gathered indirectly
that he would probably accept autonomy under the suzerainty of His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan with the payment of a trifling revenue (or tribute) to Turkey
if necessary, as an acknowledgment of the suzerainty. Should His Majesty's Gov-
ernment see fit to try and effect a settlement between Bin Sand and the Turkish
Government, it would seem desirable, I respectfully submit, to take some definite
steps within the next two months, i.e., —say before the 1st March, of which at least
a hint could be communicated by me to Bin Saud before he goes north in the spring
in crder to save him from making some arrangement with the Turks which might
be hostile to our interests. In the meanwhile if one or two British subjects who
have been pressing me to allow them to go to Katif are permitted to go there, it
will strengthen our position in resisting the conditions regarding the exclusion of
foreigners, which the Turks particularly desire to impose upon Bm Saud.
13. In conclusion I would observe that only Bin Saud, Captain Shakespear,
and myself were present at any of the interviews at which politics were discussed,
and I should like to say that the exceedingly friendly and cordial attitude of Bm
Saud at the meeting was due to his friendly feelings towards Captain Shakespear.
The latter's knowledge of the language and ways of the Bedouin from Central
Arabia was also most helpful and his presence was mainly responsible for any
favourable results which may follow from the meeting.
1 .—Memorandum of interview with Bin
In order to make his position clear Bin Saud began by giving an account of the
history of Nejd, from his point of view, of which the following paragraph is a
resume:—
His family, he said, had been in Nejd from time immemorial and had for gene
rations ruled over it without interference from outside. He himself was an Arab
Chief whose views on matters of policy naturally differed from those of European
Powers. Bedouin tribes ace not concerned m weighing the merits of different
Governments as they live as nomads, and when oppressed move off to another lo
cality. When Ibn Rashid attacked the Bm Saud family, the latter eventually won