'File 82/17 I (F 90) A.P.O.C. Port of Basra and Shatt al-`Arab Water-way' [‎10v] (33/224)

2
Enclosure 2 in No. 1.
Note on a Conversation between the High Commissioner aud Mr. Phillip, Americmi
Minister at Tehran, at the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. , Bagdad, on March 8, 19^/.
Mr . PHILLIP asked me whether I could tell him anything about the Turco-
Persian Boundary Convention of 1913. It seemed not to have been publisne an
the Persian Government and their American advisers were concerned about it,
particularly in relation to the siting of the terminus of the new railway irom the
Caspian to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Apparently, under that convention, the boundan oi
Iraq was the left shore of the Shatt-el-Arab instead of the centre of the stream, as is
usual. They were not clear how far this gave Iraq the right to impose transit lees
and port dues on goods passing through to Mohammerah from the Gulf. Mr. Poland,
the chief engineer of the Railway Survey, was greatly worried about this question,
and was even contemplating laying out the railway by a different route so as to
avoid the Shatt-el-Arab and bring the terminus to the head of the Khor Musa (or
Khor Abdulla, I forget which) on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . That would be much more
expensive than having the terminus at Mohammerah, and would also give a much
worse port. The Minister presumed, however, that the question of the boundary on
the Shatt-el-Arab could be the subject of negotiation and that Great Britain would
use her influence to secure a rectification of the boundary, since anything which
helped on the prosperity of Persia was conducive to peace in the Middle East and
the stability of the world, and the railway to the sea w T as also in the interest of British
trade.
In reply, I asked the Minister whether the question was really an urgent one, for
I said I had understood that the construction of the railway must take a good many
years and that it was possible that a beginning would be made with the Caspian
end. The Minister said no. Under the law passed by the Majlis construction was
to start at both ends simultaneously. A sum of 10 million tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. was already
available and Mr. Poland foresaw no great difficulty about beginning construction
from the Gulf at a very early date. The Shah had quite given up the fantastic idea
of waiting until the rails could be manufactured in Persia.
I then said that, so far as I could remember without reference to papers, the
history of the Turco-Persian frontier delimitation was as follows : By the Treaty of
Erzerum of 1846 between Turkey and Persia, the frontier was vaguely outlined, but
no delimitation had taken place and the border administration fluctuated. Some
where about 1908 Turkey made considerable encroachments on what was undoubted!
Persian territory, especially in the direction of Azerbaijan, and the question of
delimitation became urgent in the eyes of Persia. After some negotiations (in
which, I thought, but was not sure, that Persia had invoked Great Britain as an
arbitrator under the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1857), the Turkish Foreign Minister
or Grand Vizier, and the British, Russian and Persian Ambassadors signed a
convention at Constantinople laying down the frontier in considerable detail and
agreeing to its being delimited by a joint commission, in which, I believed, the
Russian commissioner practically represented the Turkish point of view and the
British commissioner the Persian point of view. The convention provided that the
findings of the commission were to be final and that the commissioners should transfer
any transferable territory on the spot and immediately set up boundary pillars.
The commission met in 1913, and had just finished its work and embodied it in a
protocol when Turkey declared war on the Allies. So far, at least, as the Iraq
portion was concerned, the territories transferable under the delimitation had been
actually transferred by the erection of boundary pillars. By this delimitation the
frontier of Turkey followed low-water mark on the left side of the Shatt. but I was
not sure whether this had not also been mentioned in the Treaty of Erzerum. Persia
enjoyed rights of navigation in times of peace and the boundary was so arranged as
to give a considerable space of water at the mouth of the Karun River, opposite
Mohammerah, to Persia. In time of war I presumed Iraq would have the ri^ht to
act in the Shatt as other Governments have the right to act in their territorial
waters. I conceived the position of the Shatt to be not unlike that of the Scheldt the
mouth of which is Dutch territorial water, although the Belgian port of Antwerp
lies further up and navigation through the Scheldt to Antwerp is free I did not see
why the Persians or Mohammerah should be more hampered by this situation than
are the Belgians and Antwerp by the situation on the mouth of the Scheldt