'File 10/3 III Qatar Oil Concession' [‎151v] (324/470)

P osition of A rea lying between B ase of Q atar P eninsula and B lue L ine of
A nglo -T urkish C onvention of 1913.
10. If, in these circumstances, it is accepted that the southern boundary of Qatar
should be a line running via or to the north of bakak more or less south-east from
Dohat-as-Salwa or a point slightly to the north of Dohat-as-Salwa to a point to the
north of the Khor-al-'Odeid, the difficult question arises of the position of the country
lying between such a line and the blue line of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913.
I mportance of M aintaining the B lue L ine.
11, On the one hand, it appears definitely important if possible to maintain the
blue line laid down in the unratified Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 as against
Ibn Saud or any other future ruler of this part of Arabia. While the 1913 Convention
was never ratified, the blue line at any rate represents the agreement reached at the
time between Turkey and His Majesty's Government as to the limits of Turkish
authority in northern Arabia and on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and in dealing with Ibn Saud
as the successor in title to the Turks we can, it would seem, not unreasonably take
our stand on it. The difficulties of finding any satisfactory substitute are patent.
The undesirability of giving Ibn Saud, in the absence of any definite eastern boundary ;»»-
to his territories, an excuse for territorial expansion (as distinct from the exercise, as -jli^
at present, of an informal influence and the receipt from our Arab clients of payments T '
which we do not recognise and the existence of which we ignore) in the hinterland of
the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. and of Muscat is equally clear. Such expansion would clearly
involve a risk either of his coming into conflict with the local rulers, whose treaty
relations with His Majesty's Government he has formally recognised, or of his
establishing an influence in the Sheikhdoms in question so powerful as to be
embarrassing from our point of view.
D isadvantages of M aintenance of the B lue L ine while fixing S outhern B oundary
of Q atar at the B ase of the Q atar P eninsula.
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12. At the same time, important on general grounds, for the reasons given, as
the maintenance of the blue line appears to be, the fact must be faced that in the
present case, if we continue to regard it as the eastern boundary of Ibn Saud's territory,
and if, as suggested, we accept a southern boundary lor Qatar running roughly across
the base of the Qatar Peninsula, a not inconsiderable area lying between the two
btates, and peopled by migratory Bedouin tribes, will be left in an indeterminate
political position. There is a possibility that the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, who has in
the past exercised a wide influence, and made tribal alliances of his own in the
Crucial hinterland—c/. Sir P. Cox's letter No. 176 of 28th June 1904—might prefer
some claim to such an area. But, though on this point further information will be
sought fiom the Resident, there seems little evidence of any active interest on the
part oi Aim Dhabi in any area to the west of 'Aqal. Assuming that no such claim
exists, or C0ll ld be substantiated, the alternatives are to recognise the area as
belonging to-Ibn Saud; to recognise it as belonging to the Sheikh of Qatar; or to
regard it as a political no-man's land.
lo. If we recognised it as belonging to Ihn Saud we could, if necessary, call upon
him to keep Bedouin raids into Qatar from it under control. But such recognition
would not merely be inconsistent with the maintenance of the blue line of the 1913
Convention, to the abandonment of which, as stated above, the objections appear to be ^
s long, u ^ou represent a formal acceptance of Saudi sovereignty to the borders -
-or Qatar and Abu Dhabi which might well prove embarrassing. Nt
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• Jfi' | If ' 0n the ? the r it is attributed to the Sheikh of Qatar, we should be Hki(
"t f " 11 t co - 0 P eratl0n of the Sheikh in dealing with Bedouin
i l imits But such an attribution would not merely give lo Qatar
1,1 the P-'. appear to have claimed, but woi,Id
with the orant of an ml ^ 1 1 01 P 1 ! 0 ^ 60 ^ 11 which we may undertake in connection
an rate fts coastal ^ be nece ^ry to claim the area (or at
anj late its coastal strip) for Qatar if there were serious signs of foreign interest
in it or of an intention on the part of Ibn Saud to occupyT But 3inf such
developments it seems wiser to limit our commitments and to avoid anv extension of
the area recognised by us as Qatar. y extension ui
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