'Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853' [‎100v] (200/344)

180
Part VI—Chap. XLL
1834, is a very important pronouncement on the policy to be followed towards
Maskat and in general in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. :—>
o'
Consult 12th March, No. 694.
1 am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 12th September last,
with its several enclosures, on the affairs of Muscat, and to communicate m reply as follows : —
2 The Riffht Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council is not prepared to sanction
the employment of the British arms for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the
continental possessions of the Imam of Muscat. If we were once to commit ourselves hy a
declaration of our intention to support thai Chief this line of policy must he followed up at
any expense, and it is impossible to set limits to the waste of blood and treasure which might
ensue in consequence.
3. The Wahabees evidently exist in considerable force, and the Imam has acknowledged
their ascendancy by enteriug engagements with them ; and engaging to hold his forces at
their disposal for carrying on offensive operations against their enemies. _ jo par ics
left to themselves, a sense of mutual interest will probably lead them to abstain from carrying
to extremity any differences that may hereafter arise between them ; whereas if we were to
make an offer of military assistance to the Imam, he would probably avail himself of the
support of our alliance to rid himself of the burden of the connection wh.ch he has been forced
to enter into with the Wahabees, and we should become involved in a series of distressing
operations, carried on at a distance from our resources and under great disadvantages from the
heat of the climate and the nature of the country, against a brave people with whom we
have ourselves no cause of dispute of any kind.
4. Our concern is only with the maritime commerce of the Gulfand^ as long as that is
not molested, it matters not to us whether one power or another holds dominion on its
Even if the Wahabees were to get possession of the harbour of Muscat, an event of which the
Imam himself does not appear to entertain any apprehension, it does not of necessity follow
that they would commence a system of piracy. It is more probable that, being already
sensible, from their recollection of past events in the Gulf, of our maritime superiority, they
would dread to provoke us, and as they would, under the circumstances supposed, have taken
their place as a substantive power in that quarter, that they would be glad to continue tne
same friendly connection with us which has always subsisted between us and the Imam.
5. It is believed that the Josmees and other Arab tribes in the ^ ahabee interest are
even now possessed of establishments in the Gulf, but we do not hear of any piracies being
committed by them. They are probably restrained by the fear of our well known ability to
punish them, and this salutary dread would be likely to have even a greater mfluence over
their conduct than it has at present, after they become possessed of a port like Muscat
with a flourishing trade and other interests at stake, which they must sacrifice by provoking
hostility with us,
6. But even if the worst contingency that can be supposed likely to taJce place, were .
actually to happen, and the W ahabees were not only to acquire possession of the 1 ort oj
Muscat but also to commit acts of piracy upon the Gulf trade, it is conceived that it would
be much cheaper and easier to chastise them under these circumstances, than to take tip the
question in its present state and constitute ourselves the guardians of the possessions of the
Imam of Muscat against all his enemies. In the former case the whole extent of our
operations would be comprised in such measures as might be deemed most advisable for the
purpose of putting down piracy, while in the latter we might become engaged in a system of
Continental Warfare, the final result of which it would be impossible to foresee. In the
former case we should know exactly how far we should be committed, we should engage with
all the advantage arising from our maritime superiority, and, under Providence, success
would certainly attend our efforts, while on the latter, we should abandon oui vantage giound
to fi^htthe Wahabees in their own country, we should unnecessarily provoke the hostility of
a free and powerful people and should be involved in difficulties from which we could not
retreat with honour.
7. On the whole. His Lordship in Council considered it fortunate that it has been
so clearly established by the result of former discussions that we are not under any defensive
engagements with the Imam of Muscat, and it is requested that the British authorities in the
Gulf may he instructed to observe a strict neutrality in any disputes that may arise between
him and any of his neighbours on the Continent of Arabia. Irom a reference to the 15th
paragraph of Mr. Warden's memorandum, dated 17th January 1826, it will be observed that
this line of policy is in strict accordance with that which was prescribed by the Supreme
Government when the Imam solicited our aid against the ^ ahabees, after the expedition
against the Joasmee pir«tes in 1808, on the plea that, owing to the assistance he afforded us
on that occasion, they (the Wahabees) threatened to overwhelm him.
321. The despatch of the Court of Directors The London-based directors of the East India Company who dealt with the daily conduct of the Company's affairs. , No. 6, dated 16th April 1834,
reviews our whole policy in regard tp the Arab tribes on the Gulf and the