'Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853' [‎71r] (141/344)

p art V-Chap. XXVIII.
121
hundred tons, but I do not think that this can he done, with advantage, or even that it can
be done at all ; from the want of means of containing' so larg-e a quantity.
16. I am aware of the great comfort and consolation that the sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. at Ras-ul-khima
would derive from the presence of their families, an indulgence whioli I am convinced the
Government feel disposed to grant, but under the conceived possible want of water, I am
induced, however unwilling, to recommend that the families may not yet be permitted to
proceed, unless Government should be pleased to send a further supply of water for their
eventual use.
17. The Government will perceive that these recommendations and remarks are offered
under the idea that Rus-ul-khima will not immediately be given up, but it is right for me
to state that I do not perceive any advantages sufficiently strong to induce me to wish that it
should be retained longer than the period which Government may determine as fitting for
the removal of our troops to some other place in the Gulf. I have already most strongly
recommended that the eventual removal should he to the Island of Kishm, all that I have
learnt since offering that recommendation, has tended to confirm my opinion of that island
being the most favourable situation in every respect, and if no other considerations existed than
those of political expediency, I should be disposed to urge that the removal should take place
immediately.
18. Not the smallest doubt need be entertained respecting the result of my attack that
the Arabs can make on Ras-ul-khima, yet the possibility of such an occurrence ought not
altogether to be lost sight of. The chief consideration that would induce me to deprecate such
an event is the necessity that would consequently be imposed upon us of retaining that place
until the impression that would be made by any attack should be worn off, that we might
avoid the imputation of being driven out which the Arabs would naturally conceive had
been the case, did we retire before due time had elapsed.
19. Captain Thompson 's report mentions particularly the growing ascendancy of Sultan-
bin-Sagger; the result of this will probably be the establishment of that Chieftain's power
over a considerable portion of the Arabian Coast. There is one direct inference to be drawn
from this ascendancy which is that the Chieftains on the portion of the const alluded to
have lost much of their religious feature, for Sultan has abjured Wahabism although
many who willingly acknowledge his superiority still profess that faith, which appears to
be geverally on the decline, and is now hardly acknowledged on the Versian side of the Gulf.
On the Arabian Coast Hussen-bin-Ali of Zyak, is, 1 believe, the only Chieftain who still
professes W ahabism j although old he preserves his enthusiasm, and may certainly be
considered a man of penetration and even of some talent which occasioned him to be appointed
by the Imam of the Wababis to receive from the Joasmi tribe the tribute payable to the
general treasury by the followers of Wahab. Until lately it apptared probable that Hussen-
bin -Ali would have been able to maintain himself as a powerful rival to Sultan-bin-Sagger,
but that expectation must now, I conceive, be abandoned, as none of the Chieftains seem to
coalesce with Hussen-bin-Ali with the exception of Cuzuk-bin-Ahmed, a person of little
political consideration. We may, therefore, I think calculate upon the ascendancy of Sultan-
bin-Sagger, and it is with him that we shall in all probability have to negociate the transfer
of Kas-ul-khima, for its former Chieftain Hussen-bin-Rackma appears to have rendered
himself entirely subservient to Sultan,
20. The expression made throughout the Gulf by the complete success of the expedi
tion is palpably very great, and must, whilst it is maintained, produce the most beneficial
consequences; such decidedly favourable opportunities for manifesting our superiority are
not likely to occur again ; we should therefore be careful not to run the risk of weakening
the ascendancy we have acquired ; this consideration points particularly to the advisableness
of abstaining generally from any active interference with the transactions on the Arabian
Continent,
21. It has hitherto been usual for both cruisers and merchant ships proceeding up
or down the Gulf to sail along the Persian Coast only; this practice may now be abandoned
whenever it may be convenient to do so. But to enable our vessels to approach the Arabian
Coast with safety, a circumstance absolutely necessary to secure the permanent suppression
of piracy, a minute and accurate survey of that coast should be immediately undertaken.
Our knowledge of many parts of the Gulf is extremely imperfect, and even the number of
the islands adjacent to the Arabian Coast is unknown.
22. It is extremely advisable at this particular crisis whilst the minds of many in the
Gulf still remain unsettled, that as many of out cruisers as can be spared, should be seen
frequently both on the Arabian and Persian shores, we should approach them in as friendly
and conciliatory a manner as possible, prepared of course at all times to put down the very
first manifestations of any return to piratical pursuits, but as treaties now exist with all the
independent tribes on the coast, and there is a British settlement at an inconsiderable distance
from every part of the Gulf, it is particularly desirable that all vessels captured iu the actual
commission, under an allegation, or detained from suspicion of piracy, should, unless ily
cases of extreme necessity, be sent into a British port to be condemned, previous to being
destroyed.