'Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853' [‎67v] (134/344)

Ill
Part V-Chap. XXVII
acting 1 in this manner been more deeply impressed upon the minds of all concerned than it is
at this moment.
(8) I state with graat deference that I still conceive the general omission of articles that
would be occasionally evaded, whilst the means of maintaining cur will remains, is likely to
have a better effect than stipulating for what we were not to demand on all occasions; ai
the latter would in some measure impose obligation on ourselves, as well as line of conduct
that might at times prove inconvenient and embarrassing.
(9) I shall now proceed to a consideration of the additions which the Q-overnor in Council
is disposed to introduce into the " General Treaty."
(10) The capture of the war vessels and dismantling of the forts of the piratical Chiefs
has already been reported, but it will be observed that a considerable number of the former
were given up, and some of the latter destroyed under the preliminary treaties ; I take the
liberty of recurring to these considerations as they are not mentioned a-? " principal"
advantages gained by the present treaty, whilst the promise of the Arab Chiefs to abandon
piracy is first pointed out as one of them. The latter stipulation it is true belongs to the
General T^'eaty ; ' , , whilst the former is in those that were preliminary, but I have ever
reckoned that a consideration of both together was necessary tu the appreciation of the advan
tages other of the general or preliminary treaties.
(11) The Governor in Council conceives that it would have been desirable to remove
all Chiefs concerned in piracv, or likely to afford any countenance to the practice of that
enormity; to detain in custody all -such Chiefs as have rendered themselves particularly
obnoxiou-' by their practice or countenance of piracy, and had fallen into our hands in the
course of our operations together with their piratical adherents, and to set up in their stead
inch Chiefs as could be depended on for their discouraging piracy, if no such could be found,
to make over the country to the Imaum, to prohibit the tilling out of armed vessels of every
description at ports that have been accustomed to practice piracy ; to limit the size of those
allowed for commercial purjwses so as to render them easily resisted if applied to piracy; and
to stipulate for the right of search and of capturiny all such as should be found to transgress
this prohibition. To restrain the exportation from India of timber for building large ships.
Prohibiting their (the Arabs) rebuilding their forts and stipulating for the right of landing and
destroying any works that they might attempt to raise and others of the same nature.
(12) To remove all Chiefs concerned in piracy or likely to afford any countenance to the
practice of that enormity must have involved the contingency of my leaving the sea coast iu
the event of any chieftain moving into the country as Sultan-bin-Su^ger actually did previous
to his signing any treaty. I was restrained from pursuing the contingency mentioned by
many considerations, the most immediate, of cours", was the following paragraph in my ins
tructions dated the 2/th of October ; " And you will not fail to bear in mind that excepting
in cases of particular emergency neither the troops nor the crews of the ships of
war, nor of the Hon^ble Company's cruizers, are meant to be employed at any distance from
thence (Russulkbimah) or any other place to which your operations may be directed
against any military forces of the piratical States unless their being 1 so employed should be
found essentially requisite for the demolition of the piractical vessels and craft which may
be in their ports. Sharga Sultan-bin-Sug'ger's chief port, as well as other places, might have
been destroyed without entering into any treaty whatever, but it is n t to be supposed that
tins chieftain would have voluntarily placed himself in my power and consented to any treaty
oi stipulations confirming his own disposition whilst he was at the head of his people, and the
desert of Arabia was open to him. I had not any other means to resort to under my positive
instructions not to quit the coast, except in that of entering" into recognitions, which I
accordinirly did with the view of obtaininfj what must have appeared to the world a strong
manifestation of the effects of our previous military operations. 1 had resolved on the destruc
tion of the fortifications as well as of the vessels, and I conceived thit greater advantage would
be derived from accomplishing this on the footing it is placed by the treaties than by cutting
oIt all the friendly communication, and annulling thereby all hopes of future improvement, ncTr
did 1 believe that any benefit could arise from the display of our military power in the capture
and destruction of fortifications and vessels, whilst we should in all probability have re-
embarked under the firj of the very enemy we had beaten, and who must have g-athered
confidence from our departure under such circumstances. By treating men and time were
saved, and our military power was acknowledged by a peaceable surrender of the maritime
loroe ol t id Joasmes, which my ingtructions pointed out to be the object of the expedition,
(13) With regard to retaining such Chiefs and their followers as might fall into our
hands in the course of our operations, and setting other Chiefs up in their stead, I shall offer
the following- considerations. The Hon'ble the Governor in Couneii has pleased to express
is approbation of the terms granted to Hassan-bin-Rahma whose case is viewed under
peculiai circumstances. The only chieftain and people therefore who may be considered
as having fallen into our hands in the course of our operations are Hassan-bin-Ali and his
followers. Knowing the peculiar character of this Chieftain, I at first felt disposed
to prevent his re-establishment at Zaya although it had been completely destroyed;
t lat place and the territory belonging to it was accordingly offered to His Highness
nvf- f rn . aam, w ^ 0 declined to accept of it. Here then remained in my possession a^sinirle
f am and one hundred and seventy-seven followers. I am not aware of the existence
- any Chief that could be depended on to set up in Hassan-bin-Ali's stead; the alternative
suggested of offering the territory iu question to the Imaum had been resorted to without