'Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853' [‎59v] (118/344)

98
Part V- Chap. XXV.
Grant Keir, which imposed a positive prohibition asainst the restoration of Sultan-bin-Sugg-ar
to Ms hereditary possessions ; leaving it optional with his tribe either to reinvest him in
authority, or to elect another Chief as their ruler—our conquest of that port will enable us to
demand conditions from the Chief under whose control it may be placed, which may restrain
and reform the habits of the tribe.
6. Every vessel of a warlike character will no doubt be destroyed by the armament, and
only those to be employed in commerce should in future he allowed to navigate from that
port, and the port be dismantleil. For the purpose of enforcing these conditions we should
insist on a Native Agent Non-British agents affiliated with the British Government. residing at Rassul-khima to guard against any boats quitting the
port offensively armed—our cruizers should be allowed tree ingress into the port, and by
stationing one or more armed Pattawars at its entrance, or in a secure harbour in its vicinity,
with liberty to visit Rassul-khima, whenever we might deem it expedient, a salutary check
would probably be imposed upon their future conduct. The ports of India should also be
open to the Joassmes#, our intercourse with which would not fail of civilizing the habits, and
gradually reviving in tham a spirit for commercial pursuits.
7. Should our anticipation in these respects not be realized, the project of placing th#
principality of Seer under the control and Government of the Imam of Muscat mi^ht be
resorted to. The maritime resources which His Highness commands, if well directed,
might, supported by our co-operation, effectually control every port in the province of
Oman.
8. In regard to the Imam of Mutcat, we should hope that little difficulty would be
expeiienced in convincing him of the policy of consolidating and strengthening the posses
sions and resources which he commands, instead of weakening them by an extension of his
territories. We might derive very material aid from the co-operation of His Highnesses
vessels and boats, in the future protection of the Gulph, and if for the purpose of rendering
. , c „ them more efficient. His Highness should still be
de-ous o£ the assistance .of .„ m o Europeaa
gunners, or even ot a Marine officer, to exercise
a general control in improving the efficiency of his marine, it would tend, in our opinion,
to render the Imam's vessels fully competent to aid us in securing the future tranquillity of
the navigation of the Gulph, acting in conjunction with our own cruizera.
9. The interest of Persia would as it appears to us be materially promoted, by our
interposition in restoring' the Gulph its former state of security. The petty States on the
Persian side which were tributary to her, prior to the ascendancy of the Wahabees, might be
restored to her allegiance, inclusive of such islands, the Chiefs of which may be disposed to
acknowledge the supremacy of the Persian Government, either through our aid or through the
influence of her own power, which would not be difficult of accomplishment, probably, if a
Persian force were detached for that purpose whilst any part of our armament continued in
the Gulph.
10. The snggestion of forming an establishment in the Persian Oulf in a more
central situation, which would enable us to exercise a more immediate and commanding
control over its navigation, than we can possibly do, either from Bushire, or Bussora, will
engage our attention on the receipt of the reply to our Chief Secretary's letter of the 2l8t
L< «. Bengal on the 31, t of Octoher. ^ Ottol, « r , Major-General Sir William Grant
Keir; anticipate, however, some opposition on
the part of the Persian Government to that measure, since it would be difficult we apprehend
to satisfy that power that our views were limited to the professed object of our policy, the
more especially as the Persian Government has manifested some degree of alarm at our
contemplating the occupation of the Island of Bahrein,
11. With the view of allaying these alarms and of enabling the British Envoy at
Tehran to afford to the Persian Government an explicit and candid exposition of the objects
to which the expedition is exclusively directed, and of the ultimate plan which we contemplate
for the permanent suppression of piracy, our President has addressed a letter to Mr. Willock
of which the enclosed is a copy, which we trust will produce the effect of conciliating the
Government of Persia to the arrangements which we have submitted to your consideration
or to any other which Your Lordship may be pleased to prescribe, and in particular to our
permanent occupation of Kishm. It would be premature in us to offer any opinion on the
prospect of our being capable of maintaining an establishment on that island, without
exposing the public to any additional expense, heyond what is at present incurred in the Gulf ;
whatever expense, however, may be incurred on the occasion will, we should hope, be more
than compensated by the security which the valuable trade to that quarter will derive from
the measure, and which will admit of reduction, as our influence becomes consolidated, and the
piratical tribes abandon their predatory pursuits.
12. It is our intention to station as large a marine force in the Gulph as we can spare,
with some armed boats for the purpose of visiting the different ports, and guarding against
any vessels being- equipped of a warlike character. The presence of this force, combined with
the salutary effects, which cannot but be produced by |the reduction of Rassul-khima, and
the rigid observance of a prohibition, which should in our opinion be imposed on the export of
timber, adapted to shipbuilding, to the Gulf of Persia and Arabia, from any of the ports
of India, are the measures which appear the best calculated for the gradual suppression of
piracy.