'Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853' [‎18v] (36/344)

16
Part I—Chap. VI.
CHAPTER VI.
PROJECTED OCCUPATION OF THE KARR4K ISLAND,
1808-1809.
40. During his recent return voyage from Persia to Calcutta, General
Malcolm had formed an important project—in fact it was a revival of an old
and long cherished design—which would place us in a position to baffle the
intrigues of our enemies in Persia and in the Gulf. This was to occupy one of
the important Persian islands, preferably the island of Karrak. He supported
his project by an array of arguments, which are quoted below :—
firstly. —That in the event of an attempt to invade India being made by an Kuropean
State, it was impossible to place any dependence on the efforts o£ the King of Persia or the
Pacha of Baghdad unless we possessed the immediate power of punishing their hostility and
treachery.
Secondly. —That the States of Persia, Eastern Turkey, and Arabia, were from thfir actual
condition to be considered less in the light of regular Governments than as countries full of
combustible materials, which any nation whose interests it promoted might throw into a
flame.
Thirdly. —That though the French and Russians might, no doubt, in their advance,
easily conquer those States, in the event of their opposing their progress, it was their obvious
policy to avoid any contest with the inhabitants of the country through which they passed, as
such must in its progress inevitably diminish the resources of those countries, and thereby
increase the difficulty of supporting their armies—which difficulty formed the chief, if not the
sole, obstacle to their advance.
Fourthly. —That though it was not to be conceived that the King of Persia or Pacha of
Baghdad would willingly allow any European army to pass through his country, but there
was every ground to expect that th« fear of a greater evil was likely not only to make these
rulers observe a neutrality, but to dispose them to aid the execution of a plan which they
could not resist, and make them desire to indemnify themselves for submission to a pow^r
they dreaded by agreeing to share in the plunder of weaker States—a line of policy to which
it was too obvious they would be united, and to which their fear, weakness, and avarice made
it probable that they would accede.
Fifthly. —That under a contemplation of such occurrences, it appeared of ultimate import
ance that the English Government should instantly possess itself of means to throw those
States that favoured the approach of its enemies into complete confusion and destruction, in
order that it might, by diminishing their resources, increase the principal natural obstacle
that opposed the advance of an European army, and this system, when the Government had
once established a firm footing and a position situated on the confines of Persia and Turkey,
it could easily pursue, with a very moderate force, and without any great risk or expendi
ture.
Sixthly. —That with an established footing in the Gulf of Persia, which must soon
become the emporium of our commerce, the seat of our political negotiations, and a depot for
our military stores, we should be able to establish a local influence and strength that would
not only exclude other European nations from that quarter, but enable us to carry on nego
tiations and military operations with honour and security to any extent we desired, whereas
without it, we must continue at the mercy of the fluctuating policy of unsteady, impotent,
and faithless Courts, adopting expensive and useless measures of defence at every uncertain
alarm, and being ultimately obliged either to abandon the scene altogether, or, when danger
actually come, to incur the most desperate hazard to complete failure by sending a military
expedition which must trust for its subsistence and safety to States who were known, not
only from the individual character of their rulers, but from their actual condition and
character, to be undeserving of a moment's confidence.
Seventhly. —That there was great danger in any delay, as the plan recommended could
only be expected to be beneficial if adopted when there was a time to mature it and to organ
ize all our means of defence before the enemy were too far advanced ; otherwise that moment
ary irritation which must be excited by its adoption would only add to the many other
advantages which our want of foresight and attention to our interests in that quarter had
already given to our enemies.
41. The proposal was approved by the Government of India and General
Malcolm proceeded under their orders to Bombay in order to equip a fleet
and force for occupying Karrak. Orders were at the same time issued to Sir
Harford Jones to return from his mission. But he had left Bushire before
the arrival of the orders. Meanwhile preparations were being made at