'File 61/11 V (D 95) Hejaz - Nejd, Miscellaneous' [‎229v] (475/530)

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effect only—if at all—by the armed expulsion of Ibn Saud from the province rpi
Considerable though the influence may be which the Italian Government believe '
His Majesty's Government to possess with Ibn Saud, it is certainly not powerful t
enough to persuade him to abandon Asir without a struggle, and even to suggest n
such a course to him might well deal that influence a blow from which it would ,
with difficulty, if ever, recover. II al
4. Finally, even if the Imam may not actually have attacked Asir (although
on certain maps the town of Badr, which was at one time reported to be 1 i
threatened by Imamic troops, is shown as being well within Asir), he is stated to 8 ' /
have laid claim to a large part of that province as recorded, for instance in !
paragraph 5 of Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 248 of the 1st August {Eastern ^
{Arabia), August 16, Section 4). Further, his retention of the Idrisi in the W'
neighbourhood of the Asiri frontier, where he can do the most mischief, is in itself ' sinC
an act of doubtful friendliness, against which Ibn Saud has already protested as ^
mentioned in paragraph 2 {c) (2) of the note of the 5th August from the Saudi ^
Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Calvert {Eastern {Arabia), August 24 jsl10
Section 3). ' iHis
5. As regards the alleged agreement of 1927 and other frontier arrange- P, cel
ments, there is little to be said which has not already been communicated to you bv ^ v
despatch or telegram (in particular my despatches No. 660 of the 10th August p :
and No. 860 of the 10th October and letter of the 3rd October). Further enquiry, r e(
both in London and in Jedda, has failed to elicit any more substantial information,'
but such information as there is tends to show that there was probably an oral
arrangement regarding Nejran, which was concluded in 1927 and divided the ^
regions east of Asir between Ibn Saud and the Imam in an uncertain proportion ^
and possibly regulated other sections of their common frontier as well. The
Imam himself is said to have appealed to this agreement at least twice (see ^
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the enclosure in my despatch No. 660 of the 10th August). |®t
Lastly, there are two points in connexion with Nejran, which are worth noting:
one is the arrangement which Ibn Saud is said to'have made with the tribesmen m
early last year, under which they obtained a virtual independence (see my ®n(
despatch No. 860 of the 10th October); the second bears on the expedition of ®ii
Seif-al-Islan Ahmed, the Imam's son, in the spring of 1933, which is referred to 8, ]
in paragraph 3 of the Italian note verbale of the 21st September. During the iffin
earlier part of the Yemeni operations in or near Nejran the Saudi Deputy iiss
Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda that in t
there had been no violation of the frontier at all. But it is possible that this iSaud
attitude was dictated partly by the hope that the resistance of the tribes concerned fite,
to the Yemeni troops might render intervention unnecessary. [ISig
6. In point of fact, the only frontier arrangement which is definitely known tin
to have been concluded between Ibn Saud and the Imam is Ibn Saud's decision isnf
of 1931 acknowledging the Jebel Arwa to be in the Yemen, contained in the itfes
enclosed copy of Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 486 of the 19th December, hh
1931.Q But in judging the Imam's conduct in the present crisis, His Majesty's bgn
Government have attached little importance to any of the accusations of frontier jioald
violation made against him. The facts are too confused to permit of any bpoi
conclusion on this point and His Majesty's Government are not prepared to give
any opinion upon it, far less to embark on a controversy over it. And in so far stal
as they believe Ibn Saud, rather than the Imam, to be in the stronger position in L (
the present dispute, they base that view not on any alleged agreements which |tion
may have been concluded between these potentates, but on the present behaviour
of the two parties concerned. 1^
7. After Asir, the second main point of difference between His Majesty's L
Government and the Italian Government appears to be with regard to Ibn Saud's
immediate intentions. These must necessarily be, in the last resort,' a matter of ^
speculation, 'but "after considering all the evidence supplied by His Majesty's | r
Charge d'Affaires at Jedda, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that L
Ibn Sa.ud does not desire to undertake a campaign against the Imam, much less L ■
operations on the scale envisaged by Signor Guarnaschelli, since both the financial ^ (
-and the political strain would involve him in grave risk. In particular, it is ^
becoming increasingly difficult to collect the Nejdi tribesmen for further warfare L,
in the south.- To represent his present military preparations as the deliberate '
prelude to an attack on the Yemen similar to that launched against the Hejaz
I 1 ) January 15, 1932, Section 1.