'File 61/11 V (D 95) Hejaz - Nejd, Miscellaneous' [‎9r] (34/530)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOYERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
CONFIDENTIAL.
E 1010/640/25]
Section 1.
February 23, 1932.
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Memorandum by Sir A. Ryan on the Situation in Hejaz-Nejd as it affects-
His Majesty's Government.
(A.)— Position as regards various Questions of Interest to His Majesty's
Government.
1. Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan Frontier Question. —This has temporarily been reduced to
the proportions of a nuisance, but one which causes infinite trouble all round.
It tends to envenom all our relations with Ibn Saud, and might again produce a
dangerous situation if he decided to countenance raiding on an important scale
from Hejaz-Nejd, or went further and decided to have a fling at Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan as
a definite means of escape from his troubles. We must suffer the nuisance, unless
we are prepared for drastic remedies, like driving the Amir Abdullah and
Ibn Saud into direct relations and letting them settle their tribal differences
between them; and/or attempting a readjustment of frontiers so as to give the
Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan to Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan (or perhaps neutralise it) and clear up once for all
the question of Akaba and Maan. The difficulties in the way of any remedies so^
radical are notorious.
2. Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Questions. —Our main objective is to induce Ibn Saud to
remove the embargo on trade between Nejd and Koweit. I do not know whether
Colonel Biscoe made any headway with this during his recent interviews with
Ibn Saud. The proposal to exercise pressure by increasing transit dues at
Bahrein appears to be in abeyance.
3. Arabian Air Route. —We have reduced our demands on Ibn Saud to a
minimum, viz., facilities for the landing of service aircraft at suitable emergency
landing grounds. The question of similar facilities for civil aircraft remains in
the background. Fuad Hamza's reaction to my latest representations in January
was very sticky, but Colonel Biscoe seems to have obtained more satisfactory
results from his conversations with Ibn Saud and Yussuf Yasin. I have no-
details as to what he asked for or as to how far he got any firm undertaking.
4. Shell Benzine. —No redress has been given for the outrageous raiding of
stocks last autumn. The Hejazi Government have defaulted on the contract
made with the Director-General of Finance in order to patch up the affair. My
representations in January have produced no effect, the proposals made to
Gellatley, Hankey and Co. having been of an entirely unsatisfactory nature.
5. Other Money Matters. —All efforts to get the settlement of the Govern
ment of India claim on to a satisfactory basis have failed. It is presumably
not of primary importance to obtain payment. As for the Eastern Telegraph
Company cable account, the sums involved are not large, but the habitual failure-
of the Hejazi Government to make proper monthly settlements is a constant
source of trouble. They have of late been keeping the arrears down to some
extent by paying doles on account. The situation would become really serious
only if Imperial Communications lost patience to the extent of refusing to work
the cable. Minor money matters, like the failure of the Hejazi Government to^
pay British and British-protected chauffeurs, are tiresome, but hardly of major
importance.
6. Pilgrimage. —The maladministration of the pilgrimage gives rise to
many complaints on the part of Indian and other Moslems. They are often apt
to be exaggerated, but the fact remains that, apart from his one great achieve
ment of making the pilgrim routes secure, Ibn Saud has done little to effect any
permanent improvement in pilgrimage conditions, and tends more and more to
exploit or tolerate the exploitation of pilgrims. If a good opportunity offered,
it might be worth while to attempt an agreement under certain main headings to
secure the temporal interests of pilgrims.
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