'File 9/50 (B 16) The Debai Incident' [‎14r] (34/492)

44
No. 8 A., dated H. M. S. "Hyacinth" at Bushire, the 2ad (received 10th) January 1911,
From—The Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.
In amplification of my telegram * despatched to you from H. M. S.
- o •, xt j " Hyacinth " on 29th and 31st December.
• Serial Nos. S3 and 26. f ■ i t u xi_ i. j , .
respectively, I have the honour to submit
the following report of my proceedings at Debai in concert with His Excellency
the Naval Commander-in-Chief. Embarking at Bushire in H. M. S." Hyacinth "
on 27th December as soon as the weather permitted, we arrived at Debai soon
after noon the following day.
2. The details of what occurred before onr arrival are fully recorded in
the report submitted to His Excellency by the Flag Captain, which he is
forwarding to the Government of India in the Marine Department by this
post; and I would refer you to that communication for a narrative of the
incident. All I would propose to do now is to forward translations of the
communications which passed between myself and the Shaikh, and to add such
comment on the situation from a political point of view as seems called for.
3. The Shaikh naturally feared to come off to the Flagship without a
written assurance from me that he would be landed again in safety, but having
received it came on board at once with the Hesidency Agent, Khan Bahadur
Abdul Latif, and his cousin Shaikh Butti-bin-Rashid.
As stated by the Admiral and myself in our joint telegramf of 29th (? 30th)
., „ „„ December, the evidence of the several
S cfia I No# fY* n ^ i j • i •
omcers concerned appeared to us to indi
cate that, either from apathy or by intention, the Shaikh had not taken the
trouble to prevent the attack by his subjects on the landing party, but that
when he saw that it had gone too far, and when specifically called upon by
the Flag Captain, he had done his best to stop the fii'ing and showed himself
able to do so. In fact it is clear that had it not been for his eventual assistance
the losses to oar party would have been much heavier.
4. In his interview with the Commander-in-Chief and myself, though
he clearly felt the seriousness of his position, the Shaikh adopted an uncompro
mising attitude, alleging that no message from the Captain had ever reached
him ; that he had known nothing about the landing of the party until it was
on shore ; that he had dressed and come out as soon as he could, but that by
the time he had arrived on the scene and found Captain Dick the trouble had
already begun; and lastly, that the firing had been started by our men.
It is impossible to accept these statements or to argue about them. The
Shaikh was informed what the facts were according to the collective testimony
of our officers: it was pointed out that his version of the affair was in direct
contradiction to their testimony : that, as to how the firing commenced, there
was no doubt at all, and that though we were ready to recognise that he
eventually endeavoured to stop the firing, we could but hold him, as ruler of the
place, responsible for what had occurred and must exact reparation from him.
5. "We then proceeded to make verbally the demands reported in our
telegram J of 29th December. The Shaikh
t Senai No. 23, made little difficulty in agreeing to
the payment of 50,000 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. or the surrender of 400 rifles, but declined to
accede to the other four items.
6. Dusk having by this time come on and the Shaikh having to return to
the shore, he was informed that our demands would now be sent to him in
writing and that he would have 48 hours in which to comply. This was done
in the terms of the document , of which a translation is enclosed. I may
explain that the installation of a telegraph station was included in the ulti
matum, in view of the fact that it was incumbent on the Shaikh by treaty to
accept it.
7. The location of a British Agent and a post office were approved by the
Government of India as measures to be carried out with the Shaikh's con
currence, but it did not appear to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and