'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎183v] (371/424)

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Baghdad before Grand Duke is ready, which ehould be in about 4 or 5
weeks, to assume the offensive. The date depends to a great extent
upon the disappearance of the snows which are exceptionally heavy
this year, but I am pressing him to begin as soon as possible. Until
we see definitely what the Russians can do, it appears to me to be pre
mature, and possibly dangerous, for you to occupy and hold Baghdad,
bat when the Grand Duke advances the superiority of the Allies should
be such as to make it safe for you to do so.
In order to destroy the important depots which the enemy has in
Baghdad, it would be very advantageous for your Cavalry to raid Baghdad
if it becomes possible.
The capacity of your communications must, at the present time,
be the principal factor in the situation.
What is more, I understand that during the flood season Baghdad
can be rendered untenable and that to make its possession effective,
extended dispositions beyond the" town would be necessary.
In your X-598 (Dy. No. 8482) of February 6th you state that before
April 1st you do not expect to be able to maintain a cavalry division
and three divisions at Baghdad and until you can maintain four divi
sions and a cavalry division there, I doubt, if your main body should
enter Baghdad.
Question of withdrawing 13th Division from you will, in altered
circumstances, be in abeyance for the present and your line of com
munications will be provided for by fresh troops coming out from India.
If the foregoing instructions and the War Cabinet decision do not
sufficiently explain your mission, inform me accordingly.
Further, I hope you will continue to give me your views as the subse
quent development of the situation may require, as it is difficult for me
to appreciate local circumstances.
Please remember in this connection that for the Russians to reach
Baghdad before we do is undesirable.
From the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London, to the General Officer*
Commanding, Force " D", Basra, dated 3rd March, 1917.
To avoid possibility of confusion by forwarding further instructions
is my desire, but I may remind you that since the despatch of my tele
gram No. 30195 (Dy. No. 14023), of February 28th, telegrams received
from you show that defeat of Turks was more complete than I had
reason to suppose. In consequence feasibility of occupying Baghdad
at once is probably greater than I then concluded. I hope, therefore,
thax you understand my 30195 (Dy. No. 14023) left matters to your own
judgment subject to due regard being paid to communications and secu
rity and to other points mentioned therein. Briefly our object should