'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎164v] (333/424)

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to assaulting distance had been made on a frontage of 3,500 yards in a
iortnight at a cost of 350 casualties. In the process 25,000 yards of
trench were dug and a large proportion of this wired in spite of bad
weather, heavy rain, and active enemy opposition.
The points of interest in this phase are first General Maude's plan
and secondly the method of approach to the Abdul
Comments. TT ...
Hasan position.
Immediately the attempt to cross the Tigris failed, the C.-in-C. turned
to the clearing of the right bank and adopted a systematic and deliberate
scheme which seems typical of him. He was now relieved of the hamper
ing effect of his previous instructions as to casualties.
The method adopted by the 3rd Division to approach an entrenched
position is of interest, but well known on the western front. It is slow,
often costly, very fatiguing, but sure. A long advance followed by
attack, as at Tekrit is quicker and involves less work, but in case of failure
means very heavy losses, and retirement over a long stretch of open
ground before cover is reached.
The Mohamed Abdul Hasan operation was really an accelerated
isiege approach in which every step was consolidated consecutively,
and was carried out with considerable speed and comparatively little
Joss. The advance however took just over two weeks. At first the
Army Commander in discussing the matter with the G. 0. C. Division
.about December 27th, was inclined to consider the method too slow, and
suggested a general advance which would dig in on the line gained. This
was really the method attempted at Sannaiyat on April 6th. It is
noteworthy however that he seems to have changed his opinion later,
.as methods similar to those employed at Mohamed Abdul Hasan were
used by him in subsequent fighting on the Hai.
It must be remembered that it was essential that there should be no
more reverses. The British Troops in the two Corps engaged had never
yet had a real victory over the Turks. They had suffered the humiliation
•of seeing Kut capitulate in the teeth of their endeavours, and in spite of
their heavy casualties. They had undergone long periods of privation
and acute discomfort, much sickness, great heat, and knew by bitter
experience the extraordinary power of Turkish rifles entrenched in this
terrain.
Phase V.
Clearing the Khadairi Bend, January 7th—January 19th.
By January 7th all was ready for the assault on the Abdul Hassan
position in the Khadairi Bend.
On the 6th G. H. Q. had issued 1. E. F. T)' Operation Order No. 2
for the attack.