'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎162v] (329/424)

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December 21st. —In the morning Crocker's Force covered by the 7th-
Brigade to the north, withdrew without incident to the Hai.
The 3rd Division of the I Corps were ordered by G. H. Q. to reconnoitre
the enemy position in the Abdul Hassan bend with a view to our line^
being advanced on this front.
It should be noted that we had by now got a footing on the Tigris
bank on a frontage of 500 yards at the extreme point of the Kut bend
(36 c. 9-4).
G. H. Q. issued orders for the strengthening of defensive works-
A reserve line from Maqasis on the right to the Hai at 47 c. 9*2 on the left
was under construction and the III Corps were asked to reconnoitre and
start work on an intermediate line from Kala Haji Fahan to about 46v
central and thence south-east.
Work on roads was steadily continued.
A raid by 9 aeroplanes was made on Bughaila and f ton of explosives
dropped on enemy shipping and stores.
GeneralMaude'sstatementto the C. I. G. S. that he could now cut
the enemy's communications instead of threatening
them is of great interest because it seems to bear
out the supposition that his intention at the opening of the offensive was
to compel the withdrawal of the enemy rather than their encirclement.
The great dispersal of force is also of interest. The army was strung
out over 30 miles of front. There was no general reserve and the force,
detailed to make the crossing was only 1 brigade of infantry and 1 cavalry
brigade.
Therefore even if a crossing had been effected, there was no body-
in hand sufficiently large to place across the rear of the Turk and block
his retreat.
The operation seems to have aimed at compelling his withdrawal:
rather than achieving his destruction.
General Maude's other statement to the C. I. G. R. that he broke off'
the operation, and would not force the crossing because he did not wish,
to incur casualties shows how the factor of losses was affecting his plans. •
It is interesting to consider the possible results of -an attempted,
crossing with the whole Cavalry Division and a division of infantry.
With regard to details :
First, the operation entirely lacked surprise. The approach march
was carried out in broad daylight and the force was in contact with the
enemy before the river was approached. They were therefore prepared,
though very weak in numbers. Moreover it seems probable that previous
excursions of the Cavalry Division had put the enemy on his guard in
this direction.
Secondly, the tactical power at the disposal of General Crocker was
in no way fully developed. If it had been, with his immense superiority