'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎160v] (325/424)

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The fighting during the day was not serious the total casualties being
under 200.
The Turks were discovered to be holding an entrenched bridgehead
on the line 36 c 8-3—46b 9*8—35 central.
December 16th. —The line reached by the III Corps was some 1,000'
yards from the Turkish position at its nearest point.
The line reached on the 15th was consolidated and no further
advance made here.
The Cavalry Division made a reconnaissance towards the Shumran
Bend.
If General Maude's object is accepted as compelling the Turks to
withdraw by threats against their communication then the steps in the
plan adopted become clear—the extension of the
ommen^on e flank to the Hai, the deliberate consolidation
of this new line and the manoeuvres—otherwise
somewhat difficult to understand—of the cavalry to tJie west.
Further, if General Maude's object had been the surrounding and
complete destruction of the enemy would he not have adopted a different
plan ? A plan something after the style of that which General Allenby
carried out at the battle of Beersheba-Gaza when the situation was
somewhat similar ; a plan swifter in action, more offensive in spirit,with a
greater weight at the spearhead and without so much dispersion of force.
Above all, would he have indicated his manoeuvre and actually induced
the Turks to strengthen considerably their forces on both banks near
Shumran by the operations of the 17-21st December ?
As it was, the initial movements round the Turk flank were so slow 7
deliberate, and weak that the enemy had ample time to withdraw if he
had wanted to.
The dispersal of force by the dispositions of the Mth Division
Comments on the ^ )e noted; as also the slowness of
Operations. ^ le advance of the 39th Brigade on the lith
December.
The action of our R. F. C. against the pontoon brigade had resulted
on 15th December in cutting off the Turks on the south bank about the
Hai.
Their strength here w as only a weak brigade and they were confronted
by a whole corps and a cavalry division.
It seems to have been an ideal situation for destroying completely
this small Turk Force.
G. H. Q. ordered a rapid advance though they qualified this by the
order issued at 1500 already quoted. This may have accounted for the
slow advance of the III Corps and the stopping of our line a thousand
yards from the enemy without any serious fighting.