'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎153r] (310/424)

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at various sites uncoimected save by water—and tliese were incon
veniently situated.
8. The force contained no one with any experience of Port and Base
organization, and subject to minor improvements and developments,
nothing happened to improve matters or prepare for operations or a
larger scale.
9. What was sufficient for a small force operating close to Basra, was
quite inadequate when the force increased—and tried to operate tar £•
field. There were neither port craft, port labour, nor wharves nor
land to unload the transports, camp the troops, or receive the increased
stores. Swamp land prevented any well planned lay out.
10. Nor were there river craft sufficient to maintain troops as they
advanced up stream. The only big river within reasonable distance of
the gulf wap the Indus, which had practically discarded river trans
port. River steamers were no nearer than the Ganges, Brahmaputra
and Irrawaddi. Several were sent round, but partly owing to the
distance and weather, partly owing to incompetent and ignorant fitting
for the sea voyage many were lost.
11. The decision to advance up river was taken without realization
of the fact that every mile meant a longer round trip per steamer and a
lesser average daily delivery at riverhead.
12. The advance to Ctesiphon was taken without sufficient river
transport to maintain the force up river. The decision to hold on to Kut
was made without sufficient transport to supply a relieving force. The
3rd, 7th and 13th divisions were moved to the front, with no ade
quate means of moving them up country, of landing them, camping
them or supplying them.
13. There was no drinking water except from the river. There were
no camping grounds within 2 miles of the river at Basra.
14. The gradual arrival of more river steamers, generally damaged
by the voyage, demanded adequate base and up-river workshops,
machinery and mechanics, which required some very determined
organization and energy in India to supply. But no one knew what to
ask for or how to organize it.
15. There was no road metal in the country, the ground became
impassable, after rain. The summer was excessively hot. The winter
-wet and cold.
1. The advance of troops up the Tigris in 1915 with the object of
•controlling the Hai (and thus preventing movement of Turkish troop
by that route to Nasariva) was comparatively
:2. Communications up ^ ^ . ,, 7 P
till the fall of Kut. easy. Casualties were tew, small amounts ot local
supplies were available, expenditure in ammunition
jand field engineering stores was small.