'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎151v] (307/424)

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unless and imtii sanction for it is given, but in the meantime the General
Gffieer Commanding should continue to improve the river and railway
communications and maintain as forward a position as the state of his
communications will allow and as can be made secure tactically without
incurring heavy losses, whether caused by the enemy or by climatic con
ditions. Military and political considerations connected with Nasiriya,
the Muntifik andBeni Lam tribes and the Pusht-i-Kuh Bakhtiari country
suggest that our present positions should be maintained if this can be
achieved without undue sacrifices but we desire your views as to the
feasibility of this course. Doubtless you will consult Sir P. Cox as to
the effect on the Arabs of any withdrawal. Further, the Mesopotamia
Expeditionary Force should ensure that hostile parties do not work
down south across the line Shushtar-—Isfahan. No further reinfor
cements for the force must be expected. On the contrary it may become
necessary to withdraw the 13th Division which was sent to Mesopotamia
in order to assist in the attempted relief of Kut-el-Amara. Ends.
It will be observed that it is the wish of His Majesty's Government
that the force should be kept as far forward as feasible, and in this con
nection I wish you to understand that so far as I am personally con
cerned the proposal as to the dispositions of the force is a matter which
I leave entirely to your judgment.
It will also be observed that the responsibilities of the Force extend
to the Shushtar—Isfahan direction, but this is not likely to make any
material demand on the force.
The necessity of relieving some of the white battalions by battalions
from India should also be considered.
With regard to feasibility of eventual advance in Baghdad direction
I have informed the War Committee that in my opinion—
(а) We have not got and for an indefinite time are unlikely to have
available the number of troops necessary to seize and hold
Baghdad.
(б) For a long time to come we cannot hope to maintain them there
even if we had them, owing to long and difficult communi
cations.
(c) In other respects their positions at Baghdad would be unfavour
able in a military sense and would have no decisive effect
on the war.
The whole situation should be considered by you with Cox and Maude
in all its aspects and your proposals should be reported with special
reference to any change in dispositions you deem necessary.
The necessity for being as strong as possible in the decisive theatre
especially next spring should be kept in mind.