'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎140v] (285/424)

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But except for two small rajfls not a single offensive move was ever made
beyond the defences. No effort was made to detacli troops from oppo
site the relieving force.
Another lesson is the great importance of retaining potential power
of manoeuvre.
There was a bridge intact at Kut when General Townshend arrived
there, and for a week later.
He jeopardised this, for what seem inadequate reasons, and then
had it blown up in such a way that the majority of the material was
lost to him.
He himself saw clearly, and constantly reiterates, the only useful
•function of his detachment i.e., to detain as many Turks as possible :
numbers at least as great as his own. In this he failed, and that failure
may have been largely due to Turkish certainty that he had insufficient
bridging material, and that therefore a break-out on the Southern bank
was very difficult.
Lastly the question of the Arabs.
For political reasons it was considered advisable that they should
be kept in Kut, and humanity dictated this course. Nevertheless their
presence was an extremely serious handicap, and the numbers
should have been very largely reduced, many more being expelled and
their stores of grain purchased. It may have been humane to keep
the Arabs in Kut and allow them to eat up their own grain and ours,
but when the terrible results of this solution of the problem in sold
iers' lives are considered it is hoped that in a similar situation the plan
adopted inKub will be avoided at all hazards. (See The Green Curve.)