'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎129v] (263/424)

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4. The XIII Division was going forward to attack the Fallahiya
Position, this attack to take place shortly after noon.
At 1430, the YII Division was to advance and take up a position
in rear of the XIII Division, preparatory to a night march and the attack
afe dawn of the Sannaiyat Position, between the marsh and the long com
munication trench (T. C. 18) (Not attached).
5. On my return to Divisional H. Q., I gave my preliminary instruc
tions for the proposed night march^and attack at dawn to the G. Os. C.
19th and 28th Brigades, who were to carry out the attack. A Divisional
Staff Officer, accompanied by a Staff Officer of each of the above Brigades^
went forward to carry out a reconnaissance of the ground over which the
night march was to take place. This reconnaissance failed to obtain
any information as the attack on the Fallahiya Position by the XIII
Division had been postponed until dusk, and the ground over which
the night march was to take place was still held by the enemy.
6. At 1430 the Brigades moved forward independently, and were
concentrated by 1630 about 8-D-0-6 (T. C. 18).
7. The 21st Brigade was ordered to go forward as soon as the XIII
Division had captured the Fallahiya position and take it over from the
XIII Division. This was duly carried out; the 21st Brigade moving
forward at 2130.
8. YII Division Operation Order No. 29 for the night march and attack
at dawn is attached as Appendix IV. (Not attached.)
9. The 19th and 28th Brigades assembled at the starting points
as ordered but considerable confusion was caused by units of the XIII
Division returning from the attack on the Fallahiya Position passing
through this point of assembly while the two above Brigades were forming
up. Owing to the delay thus caused, the Column did not leave the start
ing point until 0155.
During the advance up to the Fallahiya Position, other units of the
XIII Division were encountered, some marching back and others
bivouaced in shallow trenches and ditches, running across our line of
advance. West of the Fallahiya Position, empty Turkish trenches formed
serious obstacles in the dark, and caused further delay. These trenches,
obliged the Column to alter its formation as over a particularly deep
tiench only one crossing place could be found, and Brigades had to get
into column of route to pass over this.
10. Owing to these delays, I ordered the two leading Brigades to
deploy into attack formation at 0500, while still some distance from the
enemy's position. As no reconnaissance of the position or of the ground
could be made, and as the maps differed, there was considerable uncer
tainty at the time as to the distance between this position of deployment
of the position to be attacked. It was afterwards found to be about
25000 y^rds.