'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎108r] (220/424)

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Moreover the success of tlie 8tli Brigade in actually reaching the he ■
doubt from the east in the evening under more difficult conditions
emphasises this point.
By the time this brigade attacked (1600) the Turks were in full
strength, and the Eedoubt very strongly manned. The attack was
delivered over 3,000 yards of perfectly flat open ground with the sun low
in the eyes of the attackers and behind the backs of the defenders. It
was delivered on the long face of the Redoubt, where there were 3 to 4
lines of fire 200 yards in length, and had to cross directly the Dujaiia
Depression down which enfilade artillery and M. G. fire had beea well
organised by the Turks from the right (North) flank. But the attack
was properly formed up and launched, every man knew the objective,
and no halting was allowed ; the method of continuous advance in great
depth was adopted.
The result was that in spite of the enormous concentration of fire the
Turks were able to bring to bear upon them 8th Brigade stormed the
Eedoubt and actually seized the crest of the hill. They had lost nearly
50 per cent.in the effort however and being unsupported, were turned out
by an immediate counter-attack of fresh Turkish troops from behind
the hill.
To return to General Kemball's morning attack. Had the attack
been made by two of his Brigades in line, with one in reserve and been
launched even as late as 0800, there can be little doubt it would have
succeeded.
There was no great danger to be apprehended from the left flank.
The cavalry were operating in this direction, and with one infantry brigade
in hand, a single battalion at most would have been ample precaution here
It is doubtful if any of Kemball's Force got within 800 yards oi
the Redoubt. Yet their casualties during the day were 24 per cent.
This illustrates the effect on troops advancing by rushes of undisturbed
rifle fire from trenches.
Further confirmation of the weakness of the Redoubt garrison can
be found in the records of the 37th Infantry Brigade.
The role of this formation was to take up a position with M. Gs.
on some low sandy hillocks about 2,000 yards due east of Dujaiia and
co-operate by fire with Column B's attack on the Redoubt. The posi
tion was reached about 0600 and the Infantry of the Brigade proceeded
to dig in undisturbed about 800 yards closer to the enemy {i .e., afc a
range of 1,200 yards). So palpably empty was the Redoubt that they
asked permission to push on and seize the Redoubt themselves
Presumably in view of the explicit detailed orders laid down
and the lack of communication to higher autnority, this permis
sion was withheld. Turk reinforcements were seen to arrive at Hhe
Redoubt and file into the trenches from about 0900 onwards
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