'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎106r] (216/424)

181
Further, if it had still been considered desirable definitely to differen
tiate the functions of Columns A' and " B,' a separate Commander and
Staff should also have been appointed in addition to command the three
Brigades of the latter Column. It is very difficult for a Brigadier to
command a column of two Brigades as well as his own Brigade.
Whether the Cavalry Brigade should also have been put under the
orders of the Commander of this whole force is a more open question,
but it is considered that it would have been advisable.
In view of the impossiblity of careful previous reconnaissance, except
Night march. t0 a Very llmite f extent by air, and the extra
ordinary difficulties inherent in such an operation,
the march was astonishingly successful.
The peculiar difficulties of the previous concentration and the for-
mmg-up of the troops were overcome satisfactorily, and all arrangements-
made seem to have worked well.
The formation adopted appears on examination to have been suitable.
Concentration was essential: and marauding Arab bands had to be-
guarded against.
A few further details to note are :—
(i) The very late arrival of Corps Orders, and the fact that Column-
Orders were only issued when the troops were actually mov
ing to the rendezvous. This may have been immaterial if
details had been settled primarily at Conferences, as was pro
bably the case. The late arrival of the Orders is strange, as
they are timed 1400 March 3rd. It should be noted that
these Orders were, in fact, modified in many details at Con
ferences prior to the operations. A later Corps Order (No. 26).
was issued apparently on March 6th, but it is not certain that
this was actually received by all the troops concerned.
(u) Position of H. Q. of formations. Those with their signals
and liaison officers are quite big enough to form a small
column of their own on the directing flank of each formation.
It is a nuisance having all the animals there, but it is the
best place for the G. 0. C., B.M. and Liaison Officers.
(iu) Position of guides—(20 yards ahead of flank column on directing
flank). 2 assistants at least are required.
(iv) Importance of having infantry (and no other arm except pos
sibly sappers) on both flanks continuously. The only
arm that can be depended on to keep distance and'
c ressing. Infantry on the flanks of guns or transport must
be mside ' the formation.
(v) Scout pairs are not efficient as protection in front. It is essen
tial to smother all opposition at once. For this more than-
2 bayonets are required.
Platoons are a convenient ske • sections often on the small side.