'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎101v] (207/424)

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Were it possible to combine an attack on Ha una with a crossing further
upstream behind the Turkish trenches, a decisive victory might be gained.
That something of this kind was in Gen. Aylmer's mind may be seen bv
forwa rd move of the 3rd Division on February 22nd. This advance
came as a complete surprise to the Turks, whose camps on the north
bank were shelled at close range on our occupation at dawn of the Sandy
Kidre bend, 4 miles m rear of Hanna. Unfortunately only a feint with
ummy pontoons was possible as there was no transport for the real
pontoons.
Thirdly.—Action on the right bank against the Sinn position. This-
position would probably be only lightly held, and there was a distinct
possibility of surprise.
The Turkish defences in this sector lacked depth, and success here-
would be likely to lead to decisive results (as a glance at the map will.
Bilow). But owing to shortage of land transport the question of supply-
would be difficult. 11 ^
Such a move would put us at once within sight of Kut and in direct:
touch with its garrison. The possible co-operation of that garrison is
eat wit in Chap. XVII. Here it is only necessary to mention the
advisability of placing Gen. Townshend under direct command of Gen
Aylmer.
It seems then that:—
{a) Action north of the Suwaikiya marsh must be ruled out.
(6) The assault of the Hanna position would be feasible but a very-
difficult and costly operation.
(c) Crossing of the river behind that position was impracticable,.
for lack of a mobile Bridging Train.
{d)The plan actually adopted promised the best prospects of success..
Information available to Corps Comman
^On the 9th air reconnaissance was impossible as the weather was-
atrocious. On the 10th air reconnaissance was still impossible. Arabs
reported that the Turks had retired, beyond Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. and Ora. The force
on the right bank left Ora at dawn on the 9th. The force on the left
bank reached Man, east of Sannaiyat and South of the Suwaikiya.
Marsi. liie 6th Division reported movements back from Es Sinn
On the 11th reports showed that the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. was held; 11,GG0 mem
were on the left bank (probably the remains of the 52nd, 35th and S8tlb
i-vs.) with Cavalry. Es Smn appeared to be empty at neon. SCO men
were seen at Abu Rumraan. On the 12th ?th Division reported that
the enemy were entrenching 2 miles to the front, his left flank was on a
redoubt 21 miles up Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. and that he appeared to intend to .tand ardl
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