'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎92v] (189/424)

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the Turkish lines in the afternoon, and in the evening a column of trans
port which was proceeding eastwards was shelled and forced to turn back.
An aerial reconnaissance which was carried out in the afternoon disclosed
little that was fresh in regard to the dispositions of the Turks. The
weather throughout the day was cool and cloudy, but the surface of the
ground was still so soft as to render movement of any kind a matter in
volving much exertion and considerable difficulty ; and from this fact,
coupled with the trend of the reports as to the nature of the reply that
had been made by the Turks to the shelling, it now seemed as if they
would accept battle.
By nightfall the greater part of the wire protecting the Turkish lioe
had apparently been cut by our gun fire, and although the entrenchments
were said then to be occupied by the enemy in strength, it is not impos
sible that this would have been a more propitious moment for the delivery
of the attack than the morning of the 21st January. No change, how
ever, was made in the programme. During the night of the 20-21st
the bombardment from the left bank was, therefore, continued, and the
broops on this bank of the Tigris made some ground. Those on the other
bank meanwhile did their best to render assistance by means of gun and
rifle fire, and also placed machine guns in positions from which effec
tively to enfilade the enemy's trenches on the 21st.
Early on the 21st January the British infantry on the left bank
of the Tigris were disposed as follows : On the right of the 19th Infantry
Brigade, which was now under General Norie, as General Harvey had
been seriously wounded on the 20th, was one company of the Seaforth
Highlanders entrenched at a distance of about 450 yards from the
Turkish line. On their left were the 125th Rifles, and then came the
9th Bhopals and the 102nd Grenadiers, each finding their own
supports. One company of the Seaforths was in echelon behind the right ,
and in the second line were the remainder of the 28th and 92nd
Punjabis. The system adopted^ therefore, was in principle to dispose
the various forward units in depth, so that each might find its own
supports and early mingling of battalions,with its resultant disadvan
tages, would be avoided.
The 35th Brigade, under General Rice, was drawn up on different
principles. On the right and some 400 yards from the enemy's
main line were the 41st Dogras, occupying a frontage of 250 yards, and
about 100 yards in front of their left and holding the same frontage were
the Black Watch ; 130 yards behind the rear of the 41st were the 37th
Dogrjio. and the 6th Jats were in support of the Black Watch ; lastly
1,000 yar^s behind was the Brigade reserve, consisting of the l-5th Bufis
on the right and the 97th Deccan Infantry on the left.
The 9th Infantry Brigade, under General Egerton, had left its
bivouac at 0300 and although much delayed by the fact that the