'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎91r] (186/424)

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the 19tli Composite Infantry Brigade, whicli besides its own battalions
included the 9th Bhopals from the 21st Brigade and the 102nd Grenadiers
from the 35th Brigade. Behind the left of the 19th Brigade and some
2,000 or 2,500 yards from the enemy's front line were the 72nd and 77th
Howitzer Batteries, with the 61st (less one section) in rear of their left.
The 20th, 28th and 1-lst Sussex Field Batteries were behind t he 35th
Brigade and were also about 2,500 yards from the Turks ; and in rear
of the centre of our line and perhaps 3,000 yards from the enemy were
the two guns of the 104th Heavy Battery, making up a grand total of
30 guns. During the day the 9 th Infantry Brigade also mo Ted to a
position on the bank of the Tigris not far from the artillery which was
behind the 35th Brigade ; and the headquarters oi the 7th Division were
in a watercourse on the bank of the Tigris behind the 9th Brigade.
In accordance with the orders which had been circulated by General
Aylmer, Younghusband had, on the 19th, sent out provisional instruc
tions for the attack. Under these five bombardments ot the enemy's
positions were to be made on the 20th, each lasting lor twenty minutes,
and a period of one hour and forty minutes was to elapse between each
bombardment. Intermittent firing was also to take place during the
night of the 20-21st, but there were, in addition, to be two strong bom
bardments each of fifteen minutes duration. Early on the 21st an in
tensive bombardment would be made which would be heralded by a
salvo from the eighteen pounders, and the subsequent timings of the
programme for the artillery would be taken from this salvo. It appears,
further, that the fire of the guns was both to be directed on various im
portant localities, and was also to be employed in countering that of the
Turkish artillery; and that in the whole action about 12,000 rounds
were to be expended, a total which was not extravagant having regard
to the task before the troops and their numerical weakness, but was
probably as large as could in the circumstances be allowed.
Orders in greater detail were again issued from the headquarters of
the 7th Division at about noon on the 20th. In these it was laid down
that the assault of the infantry would commence on the 21st, ten minutes
after the artillery salvo, and the fire of the guns would then be directed
tor ten more minutes on the enemy's second line, and subsequently on
the areas in rear of the second line. The main attack was entrusted
to the 35th Brigade, about 1,700 bayonets, and this would be made on
the frontage from the bastion lying 500 yards from the river to the salient
work standing near the bank of the Tigris, and inclusive of both locali
ties. A matter of detail which should have been within the scope oi the
responsibility of the Brigadier was then mentioned, and directions were
given that prior to the attack a detachment of the company of bombers
was to be organised for the purpose of pushing along the trenches to the
north of the bastion, and securing the flank of the brigade ; and that a