'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎77r] (158/424)

movements, the more direct tend to resolve themselves into bludgeon
work, and important results are then seldom attained. It is plainly
most difficult to strike the happy mean, and whatever the plan, victory
in every case is due rather to skill in executing than in projecting an
operation.
In this connection it may also be pointed out that General Aylmer's
position was probably too far from the bulk of his corps, and from the
chosen area of decisive operations. It is doubtless right for the com
mander-in-chief of a large army to be well in rear during battle, and
beyond the reach of distraction by local events ; but this maxim cannot
be applied to small forces and especially when, as was now apparently
the case, means of rapid commimication are wanting owing to the hurried
improvisation of a Signal Service. It is suggested, therefore, that.
General Aylmer should have placed his headquarters on the right flank
where the decision was to be made. On board the u Medjidieh" he
was not in a position to be able to influence the operations of the out
flanking column ; and he could, in fact, only use his slender reserve to
assist the remainder of the force in holding the enemy to their entrench
ments, or in meeting a counter-attack which was not to be expected
unless the operations against the Turkish left met with misfortune-
As so important an operation was, however, confided to General Young-
husband, it was surely superfluous to lay down the formation to be
adopted when advancing from the position of assembly.
In pursuance of the plan of the Commander of the Tigris Corps,
Sir George Younghusband began, as has been stated, to withdraw his
artillery during daylight to the rendezvous at the position occupied
by the 35th Infantry Brigade, for the very broken ground near the river
would render movement after nightfall a matter of great difficulty ;
but the guns were first sent-towards Shaikh Saad, as if returning to camp
for the night. The concentration of the division was completed by
2130 And, a quarter of an hour later, the march was commenced.
The three Infantry Brigades fiad formed up in line of columns of fours
with an interval of thirty yards between the brigades, the 35th, to which
the 62nd Punjabis had been attached, being on the right, the 19th in
the centre, and the 21st, with the addition of the 1/9th Gurkhas, on
the left. A small advanced guard was supplied by the 19th Brigade,
and the others were responsible for securing the flanks. The five batteries
of artillery followed the infantry in line of battery columns, escorted
by one company of the 128th Pioneers, then came the ambulances and
the water supply column of twenty army transport carts, and lastly
the rear guard of one company of the 128th. It seems that the 6th
Cavalry Brigade followed the division.
The mgbt was fine but cold, and there was a heavy dew. The moon
was in the second quarter, and as the ground was level and the enemy's