'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎56r] (116/424)

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Sir Jolm Nixon concurred with General Aylmer in giving preference
r to the method of methodical advance in force, unless it became imperative
'to effect the relief of the garrison.
General Townshend did not immediately send a direct reply to this
appeal, but telegraphed that cases of self-mutilation, and of sleeping b/
sentries when on their posts, were occurring among the garrison, that
documents calling on the Indian soldiers to rise and overpower their
officers had been fixed by the enemy on the wire in front of our trenches,
and that some soldiers had been overheard using seditious language ia
the town of Kut-al-Amara. But, on the 1st January, 1916, he tele
graphed that the Turks seemed to be turning the siege into a blockade,
and that only in the case of the direct necessity would an appeal be made
for immediate assistance from the relieving force. General Aylmer
therefore continued his preparations with the design of undertaking a
forward movement early in January.
Since their arrival at Ali-Gharbi the troops under General Young-
nusband had hardly been molested except for intermittent firing into
the camp by night, although a few Turkish Cavalry had, about
the 21st December, appeared in support of the Arab horsemen
who, as usual, hung about the area occupied by the British. On the
31st December General Younghusband had been warned that the 7th
Division and Cavalry Brigade might be required to advance from Ali-
Gharbi on the 3rd January, but next day, owing to the immense amount
of preparatory work still to be completed, it was decided to postpone the
forward movement until the 4th. Aylmer reached Ali-Gharbi on the
2nd January, and on the 3rd issued written instructions to General
Younghusband. In these Younghusband was informed that the first
echelon of the corps was placed under his orders, and was to begin to
move forward on the 4th January advancing on the following days as
far as the neighbourhood of Shaikh Saad. Although it was possible that
conditions in Kut-al-Amara might become so serious to oblige the first
echelon to push on from Shaikh Saad without awaiting the arrival of
leinforcements, it was not at the moment anticipated that such a con
tingency would arise. In no circumstances, however, was General
Younghusband to go forward from Shaikh Saad without direct orders
irom General Aylmer.
Fiom the information, continued General Aylmer, that had been
obtained by the cavalry and airmen and from other sources, it was esti
mated that the Turkish army now consisted of the 35th* Division, 2,500
fighting men ; the 38th Division, 2,500 fighting men ; the 45th Division,
3,500 fighting men ; the 51st Division, 6,500 fighting men ; the 52nd
c and 3 1 8th divi ? ions wer3 composed mainly of Arab personnel; tlw 45th bad
suttered 3,500 casualties at the battle of Ctesiphon; the 51st and 52nd were Turkish divK
sions which had arrived m the country, the iirst just before, the other after this battle.