'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎34r] (72/424)

CHAPTER V.
The first British advance on Baghdad, 1915.
11.—Ctesiphon and retirement.
We left General Townshend's force on the 30th September, 2 days
after the battle of Es Sinn, at Kut, with the 18th Brigade and
63rd Battery R. F. A. on ships, attempting to pursue the enemy by
water.
Above Kut, the navigation difficulties were no less than below the
town: consequently it was not till shortly after noon on October 5th
that the flotilla reached Aziziya. This place was
only 60 miles by land from Kut. The Turks,
then, had had plenty of time in which to withdraw. They had easily
out-distanced our pursuit, and had occupied the partially prepared
position of Ctesiphon, with covering forces at El Kutuniya, and Zor.
As we have seen, included in Sir John Nixon's orders, when he took
over command of I. E. F. Ci D" in April 1915, were instructions to prepare
a, plan for a subsequent advance on Baghdad. On the 30th August,
one month before the battle of Es Sinn, Sir John Nixon submitted an
appreciation to India on this subject. His idea was to follow on the heels
of the retreating Turks after the coming battle of Es Sinn. By means
of a vigorous pursuit, he hoped to enter Baghdad without another general
action. Es Sinn to Baghdad was a little over 100 miles. It was a fact
that after the previous battles the Turks had always retired great
distances. After Shaiba, they withdrew 90 miles : after the Qurna
operations, also 90 miles. Sir John Nixon may have hoped that, in the
event of their suffering a heavy defeat, they would retire a similar distance.
He was hopeful up to the 4th October of being able to accomplish the
occupation of Baghdad.
On the 3rd, he wired that he considered he was strong enough to
open the road to Baghdad, and proposed concentrating at Aziziya:
and on the 4th, he enquired whether he would be reinforced by another
division from France, so that he could maintain himself at Baghdad.
These two telegrams were despatched on the assumption that the retreat
ing Turks were demoralized.
On the 5th October, it was realized that the Turks were no longer
retreating, but had occupied the Ctesiphon position. Sir John, however,
still considered that it was advisable to 44 smash him and that nothing
could justify letting slip such an opportunity."
The Home authorities had by now realized the difficulties of the
pursuit by water and on 4th October the Secretary of State wired that
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