'The Rebellion against the Sultan of Muscat, May 1913 - July 1916.' [‎4r] (7/14)

3. The offer of tribal allowances was not likely to
prove a strong inducement, the Imam might he prevented,
hy religious scruples from accepting an allowance and
the other two leaders enjoyed good incomes from their
present positions and the appropriation of 3tate lands in
the interior.
4. The reduction of the garrison to normal strength
would leave the Sultan without support, since in war
time H.M. 1 s ships were not, as was usual in peace time,
within a few hours call of Musqat.
Reports were however received from the
interior that the rebels were discouraged by the January
reverse and anxious to come to terms, the Sultan was
glad to accept the proposed mediation of the Political
Agent, and in April the latter despatched letters to
the three rebel leaders, the Imam Salim ibn Rashid al Khasi
Shaikh Isa ibn Salih and Shaikh Harayar ibn Nasir,
asking them to state frankly their views and feelings
and offering to try and find a modus Vivendi.
The Imam replied that he must consult his
people who were in the hands of their priests, that
these latter were scattered over the country from
Sharqiyah to Nizwa and were being summoned to a
conference. Hamyar suggested that a Mahomedan
representation should be sent to discuss the question.
Shaikh Isa did not reply until May when a letter
neither signed nor sealed was received from him through
the Imam. It was friendly in tone and showed a
desire to open negotiations. He mentioned that he
was sending an envoy, Abdullah ib>i Hamad, to see the
Sultan.
All reports combined to show that the despatch
of letters by the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. was popularly
regarded as a symptom of weakness on the part of the
British