'File 10/3 IV Qatar Oil Concession' [‎23r] (70/534)

2.
the Agreements were ultra vi res under the I .P. G.Oil
Agreenient; on the other hand if the Royal Dutch Shell
were brought in now as a party to the Agreements, the
I.P.C, could not legitimately object to Agreements made
by two of its constituents or to the concession being
worked by the A.P.O.C* and the Royal Dutch Shell. Mr.Agnew
explained that even two- constituent groups of the I .P.O.
were not allowed to negotiate for a concession within the
Red Line without the approval of the I.P• 0# Board which,
in this case, the A.P.O.C. had already obtained, the
question having been discussed informally with the I.P.O.
at group meetings- It had been left to the A.P.O.C. to
get a concession in this area and the A.P.O.C.exploration
licence in Qatar was held on behalf of the I.P.O. The
A.P.O.G. had been afraid that if none of the other
constituents of the I.P.O. agreed to come in they might
be left with a concession on their hands which, under the
terms of the Oil Agreement, they would be unable to work
themselves without the participation of some other
constituent group. The Royal Dutch Shell had accordingly
agreed to participate with the A.P.C.C. in working any
concession that might be obtained and the French group
had said that anything which proved acceptable to the
A.P.O.G. and the Royal Dutch Shell would be acceptable
to them. Mr. Agnew thought, therefore, that the formation
of a Shell A.P.O.C. group would be tactically undesirable
at this stage since it would appear to the other
constituents of the I.P.O. as a sort of all-British front.
In view of this explanation the meeting agreed that
in spite of the rather informal nature of the present
arrangements between the A.P.O.C. and the I.P.O. it
wo^ld be preferable on the whole that the Agreements
should be made in the name of the A.P.O.G. only. The
desirability/