'Summary of the Hejaz revolt' [‎14] (16/32)

14
The King 1 refused to be reassured about Ibn Saud's attitude. He both feared him as a centre of a
religious (Wahabi) movement dangerous to the Ilejaz, and hated him as irreconcilable to his own pretension
to bo King of the Arabs. The conferences were successful in other ways, but failed to solve the Ibn Saud
question.
King Hussein finally refused to allow Mr. Philby to return by land to Ibn Sand and he went back by sea.
At the end of December, 1917, Major Cornwallis, who was in Shmf Abdnlla's camp in the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Ais, was
informed by the Sherif that he had written to Ibn Saud in March, 1917, guaranteeing' his future^
independence and that of his descendants. Ibn Sand is reported to have read this ietter to his council at
Kiadh and to have sent a suitable acknowledgment. hater, when Ibn Ivashid come to Medain Saleh,
Abdullah wrote another letter to Ibn Sand proposing co-operation against Hail ; Ibn Saud briefly
acknowledged receipt of this letter but made no allusion to its contents.
At the beginning of April, 1918, reliable information was received that Ibn Sand was in communication
with Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. at Medina to the effect that if Germany would guarantee his claims to certain districts he
was prepared to assist Turkey, but nothing came of this. However, on the accession of the new Sultan of
Turkey in July. 191H. Fakhri was ordered to inform Ibn Saud of his accession.
The next move was the Khurma affair (see paragraph 23), but whether this was inst : gated by Ibn Saud
or not has never been clearly proved. The immediate outcome, however, was a message from His Majesty's
(iovernment to Ibn Saud on the same lines as the message to Hussein (see paragraph 29).
King Hussein offered in August, 1918, to visit Ibn Saud with a view to settling their differences once
and for all (see paragraph 29).
APPENDIX C.
IBN RASHID, EMIR OF HAIL.
Ibn Rashid, Sand ibn Abd el Aziz, has been Emir of Hail and Jebel Shammar since 1908. This principality
was founded by an Abdah Shammar Sheikh, Abdullah ibn Rashid, who in 1836 was made Governor of Hail by
the Emir Feisal of Riadh. Since the last years of the 18th century, all Jebel Shammar was under Nejd, and most
recently under Egyptian overlordship. Abdullah did not, however, throw off his dependence at once, but
greatly increased his power during Feisal's detention for five years in Cairo, and, dying in 1847, left his
successor, Telal, virtually free of Nejd. The latter's successor, Mohammed, the sirongest native ruler seen
in Arabia in the 19th century, consolidated his principality, and not only maintained complete independence,
but formed the greatest confederacy of tribes ever collected, and in 1892 conquered all the dominions of
Nejd and ruled as sole Emir of Central Arabia till his death in 1897. (See Appendix B.)
Since that time, Jauf el Amr has been lost to Nuri Shaalan, and despite active Turkish support in
1904-05 no territory has been |.»ermanently added to the Shammar domains. The Emirate, therefore, was at
the outbreak of war in 1914. confined to Jebel Shammar.
The Ibn Rashids always maintained closer relations with the Ottoman Government than any other
independent Arabian princes, and until the Hejaz revolt in 19i(j were consistently friendly with the SherLfate
of Mecca.
The Rashid house is accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of
domestic muiders. Another noble Shammar family, the Subhans, is very intimately connected with it and
shares its notoriety. The present Emir is a son of Abd el Aziz, who reigned from 1897-1906, when he was
killed in battle against Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd. Abd el Aziz was succeeded by his son, Mitab, who, before
he had reigned a year, was murdered by a cousin, Sultan Ibn Hamud er Rashid. Sultan was then killed by
his brother, Saud ibn Hamud, but the latter in his turn was murdered in 1908 at the instigation of flamud
ibn Subhau, who brought back his nephew, Saud Ibn Abd el Aziz, from Mecca, where he had been sent for
safety, and set him up as Emir. He is said to be an irresponsible boy of boorish maimers and violent and
ungovernable passions, verging on madness. He has a reputation for cruelty, and even in Arabia is accounted
fthifty and faithless.
His friendship with the Ottoman Sultan was rewarded with large presents of arms and by a considerable
sum of money sent up with Ashraf Bey early in 1915, and with the title of Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. .
There are ebtimates, varying from 20,000 to 800 of the numbers of fighting men he can put into the
field, and a reasonable estimate is something under 10,000 and over 5,000.
See also paragraphs 9 (and note), 20, and 27.
APPENDIX D.
THE JEMAL PASHAS.
There have been three Jemal Pashas connected with Syria and Arabia—
1. Ahmed Jemal (Biyuk), the Greater or Jemal I.
2. Mohammed Jemal (Kuchuk), the Less or Jemal II.
3. Mehmed Jemal or Jemal III.
In 1916, Jemal I. was General OflScer Commanding, IVth Turkish Army, and Minister of Marine. In
March, before the outbreak of the Sherifs revolt, he had Sherif Feieal in Damascus with him, but it seems
probable that he was deliberately, though perhaps to some extent sub-consciously, courting an Arab revolt
in the intention of making it the excuse to crush the Arabs.
In 1916, after the discovery of compromibing correspcndence in the French Consulate at. Beirut, he was
responsible for the murder of a considerable number of Syrian notables in an endeavour to stamp out ajuy
signs of revolt, and cleverly managed to throw the blame for these atrocities on Enver Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. .
Consistently anti-German in his policy, he quarrelled with all the Germans who were sent to Syria,
where it was obviously his ambition to maintain a vice regal independence.