'Summary of the Hejaz revolt' [‎3] (5/32)

north of Tebuk, which had previously been unmolested, was now attacked not only as
far as Maan, but even north of the latter place. Despite the British set-back at (iaza
in March, 1917, Maan itself was threatened by the Arab forces, as was also the forest
district oi Hishe to the north-west, whence the l urks were drawing their fuel supply
^for the railway.* The effect on Medina was soon evident, and had the Turks been able
to evacuate the whole or part of the garrison and the force immediately to its
north by means of the railway it is probable that they would have done so. A
programme was drawn up in November, 1917, in anticipation of the fall of Jerusalem
for the evacuation of part of the Medina garrison, after which the lebuk force was to
be evacuated.
The British victory at Bir Saba and Gaza occurred in September, 1917, and with
the development of the British threat on Jerusalem, the situation of the 1 arkish forces
on the railwav was recognized by their leaders to be serious, I he stafi officer
left in charge at Maan during the temporary absence of Jemal IILt reported
to him on the 7th November his view on the situation. He appositely compared
the attitude of ths Arabs to a gangrene which had begun in the finger (Medina),
which,* if not cut off would spread to the hand (Maan) and finally to the arm
(Syria). Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. at Medina replied to Jemal 1. on the 12th November ,
regarding the proposed evacuation of Medina, that the movement might prove the
dawn of the "Fourth Age. No authoritative explanation of the expression is forth
coming, but it is believed that according to Mahommedan tradition when the " I hird
Age " comes to an end the Turkish Empire will cease to hold the predominant position
in Islam.
The evacuation of Medina was to be completed within 75 days, but the lurks were,
and have remained, unable to carry it out owing to lack of rolling stock, want of fuel,
the impossibility of accumulating sufficient supplies, and constant interruptions of the
railway.
7. By the end of 1917 Feisal had secured the adhesion or neutrality of all the
Arabs as far up as Maan and had come to- an agreement with others in the north,^ and
could thus contemplate an advance further north into the 1 rans-Jordan country, lie
had collected mere partly trained troops and Bedouins. He was also much better
equipped with guns, sm ill arms i<nd auxiliary services than hitherto. The lurks in
Maan and in the Hishe Forest area made attempts to dislodge him from the Petra
region in October and November, 1917, but they were too weak to press home any
advantage they gained. On the other hand, the cold experienced in this mountainous
region militated against a strong offensive by the Arabs.
8. The situation therefore at the end of 1917 was, briefly, as follows : —
The Turks had been completely driven from the Hejaz except from the actual
railway ; the Hejaz Expeditionary Force at Medina, now reduced to some 11,000 rations,
was reduced in efficiency and suffering considerable privation and sickness; the
Composite Force at Tebuk, reduced to some 1,500 rations was in a similar state, and
traffic between these places was being constantly interrupted owing to the efforts of
• Sherif Ali in the area south-west of Medina, and'Abdulla in the area between Medina
and El Ula. Further north Sherif Feisal was operating against the railway in the
Maan area and had seriously interfered with the fuel supply in the Hishe forest. The
Turks found it necessary to establish a post at Tadmur to prevent the Arab movement
spreading to the Euphrates, and to establish line of communication posts on the
Yermuk Valley and l3eraa—Maan railways.
During the period under review the Arabs had engaged the Turks on some 54
occasions, inflicting casualties§ (according to Arab reports) amounting to 3,400 killed,
757 wounded, while the captures amounted to 6,766 prisoners, 44 guns, 11 machine
guns and 2,417 rifles. j|
Arab reports also recorded 42 attacks on the railway, during which 7 engines,
3 wagons, 7,770 rails, 34 bridges and 16 culverts had been destroyed.^
* A light railway ran from Aneiza (second station north of Maan) into the llishe lorest, and was usud
to transport wood fuel for the use of the engines on the Uejaz Railway. This line was pulled up at the
beginning of 191H.
t See Appendix D. t See Appendix L. § See Appemhx N.
|1 This information cannot be taken as strictly reliable, but Sir R. V\ ingate reported that in 19U»,
3.345 prisoners were sent to Egypt and 1.354 in 1917 {see Appendix D).
If In December the train containing* Suleiman Ibn Rifada, paramount chief of tbe billi tribe and hostile
to King Hussein, was destroyed. Five Turkish oflicers, Suleiman Ibn Ritada and severs i ot his stall were killed.
Ti e Ar^hs succeeded in capturing from this train £124,000 in gold and five horses and destroyed a
considerable amount of foodstuffs.
(0144-19) A 2