'Report from Lieut-General Sir P. H. N. Lake K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Commanding I.E.F. "D" on the Defence of Kut-Al-Amarah under Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., 3 December 1915-29 April 1916' [‎6v] (12/44)

IO •
were made and parts of the wall fell in, but as a matter of fact it only in
creased the strength of that post for our garrison there constantly retrenched
and blocked up the breaches with sandbags-—in fact the so-called fort has be
come a very strong high commanding redoubt.
At 5-30 A .m ., the enemy opened a heavy gun and rifle fire on the fort, and
cheering and bugling could bs heard from the eneny's troops massed in their
trenches close to the fort, but their assault did not materialise under the steady
fire of our troops.
In view of the arrival of relieving force and for other obvious reasons I had
endeavoured to find a place for throwing a bridge secretly and rapidly across the
Tigris at south or south-west edge towards north of Kut, but though we have
roughly fifty mahelis here with mists the Divisional Engineer Commander,
whom I consulted in the matter, declares it is impossible owing to want of road
way planks woodwork, and the piles will not hold in the swift running current
and slimy ooze-like mud forming the bed of the river ; there was no way of mak
ing a bridge besides except under fire.
In reply to enquiries from Corps Commander I said th^t it would hie better
to relieve me by left bank roads ; I could then join hands, and that I had no
means of crossing to right bank except by means of a and steam launch,
1 could not commence crossing until arrival of relief force, f or no shelter exists
from enemy's guns for rafts, etc., being made. My means of crossing are two
tows only, " Samana " and one launch, two barges—one undecked,—and about 50
ma^ (unmanageable in the current). The Assistant Quartermaster-General,
the Divisional Engineer Commander and the Marine Transport Officer had work
ed this out as nine days required for my crossing my force. At a rate of 700 men
crossed at a time it would take quite two hours for embarking, disembarking and
return, thus, 20 hours are required to get 7,000 infantry over. ?or animals and
officers chargers and maxim gun mules (3,003 animals), and at 3 hours a trip, it
would require 25 trips or 75 hojrs. Guns, say 3 field batteries at 4 hours a trip,
require 5 trips or 20 hours. Field Ambulances, say 3 trips at 2 hours a trip, take
six hours. Transport carts (309) means 5 tiips at 3 hours making 15 hours.
Total equals 9 days and 3 days must be added for stores and rations. I daresay
all this could be reduced to 6 days by working ceaselessly day and night; but
I suppose Army Commander will surely bring up his own bridge.
On the 24th December a very heavy rifle fire supported by artillery was
opened on the Liquorice Factory An East India Company trading post. and village at 5-15 A .M. continuing till 8-30
A M., but the enemy made no assault. Their trenches were no more than 200
yards from the village entrenchments.
The fort had been the scene of another fierce fight on the night of the 23rd-
24th, also there were determined efforts on the part of the Turks to cut the wire
entanglements. Several dead lay on the wires in the morning. On the forenoon of
the 24th December the fort was heavily shelled ; large breaches were made in
the walls and at 12-30 P.M. the garrison had to retire from the first line of
defence in the fort and the enemy ejected a lodgment, but were driven out in
their turn leaving about 100 dead bodies in the north-east.
The garrison of the fort was reinforced by the Oxfords now mustering only
some 200 rifles. Bombardment of the fort recommenced and was kept up
constantly.
From the appearance of the enemy's main camp up river and from the un
usual boldness of the Turks in attacking in the open in to-day's attack on the fort,
I was certain that they must have received reinforcements and fresh troops whose
morale had not been shaken at Ctesiphon or on 1st December at Umm-al-
Tubul.
At dark, about 200 bodies could be seen outside the fort and massing of
troops in the rear trenches could be observed indicating a new attack on the
fort.
About mid day, a 12 centimetre shell swept top of house I used as my
observation post (roof of Divisional Headquarters house) killing Captain Begg,