'File 73/7 IV (D 25) Anglo-Turkish Negotiations' [‎28v] (66/103)

his authority over adjacent islands and the nearer Bedouin tribes, the prohibition of any
interference by the Porte in Koweit's domestic or foreign questions, the exclusion of
Turkish troops from Koweit territory, and the admission of the sheikh's right to the
undisturbed enjoyment of his properties on the Shatt-el-Arab. However, as no
negotiations could be conducted without a certain amount of give and take, it had been
found necessary apparently, in order to obtain these solid advantages, to give way on
some points of detail to avoid wounding Turkish susceptibilities and it was therefore
probable that the Turkish posts at Safwan and Umr Kasr would continue, whilst the
recognition of Turkish suzerainty would be likely to entail a demand by the Porte for
the residence of a Turkish representative in Koweit. The sheikh heard me patiently
enough, occasionally interjecting a shrewd question as to exactly what might be
involved by an acceptance of Turkish suzerainty. In reply, I gave the analogy of
Egypt, where the Khedive, though nominally a Turkish Viceroy and a subject of the
Sultan, enjoyed British protection and was for all practical purposes quite independent
of the Porte, who had no word in his internal administration, the collection of revenue,
and the like.
3. The sheikh rather resented the continuance of the posts at Safwan and Umr
Kasr, but when I explained that we were endeavouring to secure the recognition of his
boundary as touching these places and that the permanent location of half-a-dozen
Turkish soldiers in a mud fort at these points really made no practical difference, he
seemed inclined to agree. His attitude, however, was quite different when I intimated
that recognition of Turkish suzerainty might entail the reception of a Turkish agent in
Koweit, as such was actually the case in Egypt. The sheikh was so surprised at the
possibility that he asked me to repeat and explain the matter to him more than
once, and when I had done so, he became most vehement in his opposition to the
idea. He begged me to telegraph at once intimating his refusal to accept any Turkish
official under any guise whatever in Koweit. He used all the arguments which I had
anticipated in my letter of the 30th April, 1913 and finally said that the presence of
one such official, for he knew from bitter experience what Turkish officials were, would
destroy whatever good the proposed agreement might hold, would weaken his authority
locally and in the adjacent desert, would lead to constant strife and the formation
of parties among his people, whilst the Turkish agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. would become a focus for
domestic and foreign intrigue which would probably involve the British Government
itself at no distant date in difficulties at present not to be foreseen. Having done my
best to reassure the sheikh I left and despatched my first telegram to Fao.
4. On the following day the sheikh came to see me with particular reference to our
conversation described above. I was surprised as he was not very well at the time and
even if in good health he seldom returns an informal visit on the following day. He
had evidently been considering what I had told him and had realised that, though his
refusal to accept a Turkish official in Koweit might be sincere enough and couched in
the most emphatic terms, he would be unable to persist in that refusal should the
British Government have accepted the principle of representation and should the Porte
demand its fulfilment. On this occasion the sheikh first reiterated his previous
arguments, every whit as vehemently, then he pointed out that Colonel Meade's
agreement of January 1899 was framed with the sole purpose of preventing what we
ijow suggested as likely to come about, viz., the advent of foreign officials in Koweit.
Further, we had expressly named the Turkish Government, as one it was particularly
desirable to exclude from Koweit, in the lease agreement for Bander Shweikh, concluded
in October 1907. Besides, at our suggestion he had repeatedly rejected German
overtures though in doing so he was forfeiting the increase in his customs revenue
which a German firm established in Koweit would undoubtedly have contributed. * He
urged that he had faithfully observed his part of a bargain, which was now fourteen
years old, and had agreed willingly to it, because he realised its advantages to himself
as well to us, and all he desired was that the exclusion of foreigners might continue as
heretofore. The sheikh then enquired what had been decided with regard to the
Bagdad Railway, in reply to which I gave him the gist of what had appeared in the
news telegrams, observing that I had no official confirmation. The sheikh evidently had
at the back of his mind that his interests had been used by us in some bargain with the
Turks, for he asked whether the settlement with the Porte only concerned Koweit
and himself or other Gulf questions and the Bagdad Railway. I replied that T fancied
probably an agreement had been reached on all questions, for that was indicated by the
news telegrams, though what I had received from the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. related only to Koweit.
He was exceedingly perturbed by the idea of having to accept a Turkish official and
reverted to the subject again and again saying there was no need to agree to that item,