'Persian Gulf Gazetteer, Part I Historical and Political Materials, Précis of Bahrein [Bahrain] Affairs, 1854-1904' [‎6] (25/204)

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Upon receipt of the Resident's reports the Resolution adopted by the Government
Government of India's letter No. 94 8 . dated 17th of Bombay, and approved by the Govem-
March 1800, Volume 106- a . of 18 0. ment of India, was to insist on the expul
sion of the refugee Sheikh Mahomed-bin-Abdullah from the Wahabi port of
Damaun, where for 16 years his incessant intrigues for the recovery of Bahrein
had been an element of disquietude extending over a considerable portion of the
coast.
26. The Resolution of the Bombay Government (dated the 15th February
, „ , _ . r-i . i860) is quoted below :—
Page 277 of Bombay Political Department, ' 1
Volume io5-A of i860.
"Commander Balfour appears to Jiave performed the duty entrusted to him by the
Resident, with great skill, firmness and judgment, and the Resident may be requested
to convey to him the marked commendation of Government for the services rendered by
him on this occasion.
The display of naval force at Demaun has for a time averted the hostile demonstration
against Bahrein by Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla assisted by the Wahabi ruler, but the
Right Honourable the Governor in Council can place reliance on the promises of the
Abdullah, and consider that the time has arrived when some measure of coercion must be
employed. Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla has now for 16 years been attempting by
intrigues to re-establish himself at Bahrein, and his plots not only occasion disquiet in
Bahrein, but have from time to time endangered the tranquillity of all the neighbouring
tribes The British Government has frequently warned Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla,
that if he continued to disturb the peace and security of that part of the Gulf, it would be
the duty of Government to remove him. This course has heen urgently required by the
Sheikh of Bahrein, and the reluctance of the British Government to have recourse to
an extreme measure evidently created some distrust in the mind of the Bahrein ruler as
to the sincerity of the friendship of the British Government. He has seetf repeated warn
ings met by repeated promises, and repeated promises followed by renewed intrigues and
renewed hostile organizations. The British Government cannot permit these feelings of
insecuritv to continue, it must also look to the fact regarding which there can be no
reasonable doubt that the Sheikh at Demaun is abetted in his designs by the turbulent
ruler of the Wahabis, that he is indeed little more than a tool of Amir Feysal and that the
ascendancy of the Wahabis in that part of the Gulf was regarded by Captain Kemball and
is regarded by the present Resident as -equivalent to their intention of piracy. It
appears then to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council that it will be a
warning to the Wahabis and to the other adjacent tribes, that it will restore
confidence to the Sheikh of Bahrein, and that it will close a long series of intrigues
and petty hostilities, if the measure long threatened be now adopted of expelling
Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla from Demaun. This is the measure advocated
by the Resident and one which the British Government has long foreseen would be
necessary. The Resident is therefore authorised to announce to the Sheikh at Demaun
that he can no longer be permitted to disturb the peace of the Gulf, that he must leave
Demaun and reside either at Gram or on the Persian shore, as may seem most expedient
to the Resident. At the same time the Sheikh of Bahrein should be required to assign
such a sum for the maintenance of Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdulla as may be considered
sufficient, to this the Bahrein ruler has always professed his willingness to consent. The
Resident will take care not to demand the expulsion of the Sheikh from Demaun, until
he has sufficient force at his command to put down all attempts at resistence, and he will
be particularly cautious to make his demoastrations entirely of a naval character and not
to be betrayed into any operations on shore",
27. In June 1861 the Resident, in compliance with the Government Reso
lution above mentioned, wrote to Amir Feysal, requiring him to eject Mahomed
bin Abdullah, the refugee Sheikh of Bahrein from Damaum, and recommending
him to enter into a peaceable convention with the Sheikh, whom by our recent
treaty we had recognised as the rightful ruler of Bahrein, Five months having
elapsed without any reply from Feysal, the Resident in November 1861 again
took the Squadron down to Bahrein, and after an " hour's firing, in which no
casualty occurred on either side," compelled Mahomed bin Abdullah with all his
faction to flee from Damaum. " From all 1 could learn,wrote the Resident "the
Wahabi authorities and traders on their coast were inwardly delighted at the long
pending question being thus settled, although His Highness the Amir could not
with due regard to Arab hospitality, openly compel Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah
to relinquish the shelter he had offered him. In any case His Highness's castle
and garrisons, both at Damaum and Katif, forbore to molest us in any way, and
on our part orders were issued to respect them so long as they continued
inactive.