'Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government' [‎73] (115/733)

BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULP.
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a party to the truce, incited by avarice and a prospect of booty, and
desiring without just cause to mix himself up in the quarrels of others,
not subscribers to the truce, in the result of which he has no immediate
interest or concern, on the grounds that if grained it would afloid a plea
to those bound, equally with himself, not to wage war at sea, whereon
to base a similar right to espouse the cause of the opponent with whom
he proposes to ally himself, and thus cause in the first instance an
indirect violation of the restrictive line and Maritime Truce, whose
obligations would be very shortly entirely forgotten and set aside by
the allies themselves on either side necessarily becoming principals.
Piracies are now of rare occurrence in these seas. Slight cases of
aggression, unattended with bloodshed, have almost annually occurred,
and must ever be expected occasionally to occur, upon the pearl banks.
Their origin is almost invariably to be traced to the practice of debtors
avoiding the settlement of claims against them,* on account of advances
of money (for the purchase of provisions during the unemployed portion
of the year, considered as a remuneration beforehand for services to be
hereafter rendered on the pearl banks), by deserting their own chief, and
taking refuge with another ; and the subsequent attempts of their lawful
head, or of their creditors, forcibly to recover possession of their per
sons, or of the amount due by them, or its equivalent from the boat in
which they sail, belonging to the tribe they may have joined. For such
aggressions and irregularities at sea, it is incumbent upon the Biitish
Resident, by the terms and spirit of the Maritime Truce, to exact
redress.
Attempts have been made to induce the several chiefs to enter into a
mutual agreement among themselves, without British guarantee, to refuse
refuge to such fugitives ; but these have ever been rendered nugatory by
Arab pride and sense of honour, as the prospect of the advantage which
each chief (forming his own, and therefore of course the most favour
able estimate of the popularity and attractiveness of his particular I
ference in any way of the chiefs of the Coast of Oman, who are intimately connected with the
British Government by agreements, and a truce among themselves made its guarantee.
It may be here remarked that in the latter case the applicants, although considering them
selves in honour bound to evince at least the pretence of exertion in favour of their ancient
friend and ally, yet experienced great satisfaction at having it in their power to adduce the
unanswerable argument of the restraining power of the British Government, contrary to
whose wishes they were not prepared to act. It must be remembered, too, and to this they
were fully alive, that by assisting the ex-chief they would have given umbrage to the ahabee
ruler. Ameer Fysul, the powerful ally of his opponent, and that, moreover, they had every
thing to lose and nothing to gain by engaging in a profitless warfare, to the prejudice of
their trade, and the interruption of the pearl fishery.
* For an accurate and interesting description of the pearl fishery, and an account of the system
of loans and advances to pearl divers, vide Welsted's Travels, Vol. I. Chap. VI. page 114.
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