'Extracts from Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia by J G Lorimer CIE, Indian Civil Service' [‎26v] (57/180)

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before execution of the agreement, that any breach of the truce, when once
established, would be treated as a case of piracy, and no regard would be paid to
the existence of a state of war on land.
The Shaikh of Bahrain, who was amenable to British influence and between
whom and the Saiyid of Oman there was at the time a prospect of war, was not
invited to subscribe to the Truce; but everywhere its conclusion was hailed with
delight by those interested in the pearl trade,—in some cases almost the entire
population. The importance of Captain Hennell's achievement may be judged
by the fact that, before this, some of the pearl merchants of Sharjah had actually
offered to pay $20 a year to the British Government for each pearl boat of which
the safety at sea should be guaranteed.
From 1835 onwards " Trucial 'Oman " becomes the most appropriate name
for the country hitherto known as the Pirate Coast, and its chiefs may henceforth
be correctly described as " the Trucial Shaikhs."
The Restric- Another suggestion made by Captain Hennell in 1835 and well received by
tive Line. the Shaikhs was that, for the protection of neutral commerce, a portion of the Guif
1836. on Persian side should be placed out of bounds for tribal warfare, even at the
times when no truce existed. On the recommendation of Captain Hennell the
Bombay Government agreed that the cruising of Arabian war-boats nearer to the
Persian coast than the islands of Bu Musa and Sirri should at all times be inter
dicted; but Major Morison, who succeeded Captain Hennell, was able to arrange
with the Shaikhs for the substitution of Sir Bu Na'air in place of the islands
previously mentioned, by which means the area liable to disturbance was still
further reduced.
In consequence of some irregular proceedings on the part of the Shaikh of
Bahrain the restrictive line was afterwards authoritatively prolonged by way of
Halul Island, of a point 10 miles off Ras Rakan, and of the island of Qraiyin, to
Ras-az-Zor upon the coast near Kuwait. No formal agreement in regard to the
line was ever executed; nor was any required.
British relations with Trucial 'Oman, 1835-53.
Series of
short mari
time truces,
1835-42.
The Ten
Years'
Maritime
Truce,
1843-53.
During the eighteen years which followed the conclusion of the first Maritime
Truce, the relations of the Trucial Shaikhs towards the British Government and
towards one another at sea continued to be regulated by the General Treaty of
1820, supplemented by a series of maritime truces similar in their terms to that of
1835. The second and third truces, concluded on the 13th of April 1836 and the
15th of April 1837 respectively, were apparently for not more than eight months
each; but the period of the fourth, signed in 1838, was fixed, at the instance of
Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar, at one year. Annual truces were arranged thereafter
in 1839, 1840, 1841 and 1842; but on the expiration of the Truce of 1840 a slight
interval occurred, by which the Shaikh of Sharjah profited to make a naval attack
on the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.
The establishment of permanent peace at sea having been proposed by Shaikh
Sultan-bin-Saqar in 1837, the attention of the Bombay Government was directed
to the question; and, in 1841, they expresesd a wish that a truce for more than a
year might, if possible, be arranged. Although the Shaikhs as a whole were not
adverse to a lengthened truce, considerable doubt was felt by Captain Hennell, the
Resident, as to the expediency of any change; he feared that a prolonged or
permanent maritime truce would impose an intolerable strain on the propensities
of the Arabs to wrong-doing and retaliation, and might so lead to a breakdown
of the whole trucial system; and he foresaw that it would operate to the
disadvantage of the Qawasim One of the ruling families of the United Arab Emirates; also used to refer to a confederation of seafaring Arabs led by the Qāsimī tribe from Ras al Khaima. , who w r ere predominant at sea but suffered severely
from the depredations of the Bani Yas on land. It was also apprehended that the
difficulty and responsibility of settling by peaceful means quarrels that would
ordinarily be decided by the sword, a duty which would necessarily devolve on
the British Government as guarantor of the truce, might prove excessive. In the
end the matter was left by Government to the experience and discretion of Captain
Hennell, who justified the confidence reposed in him by negotiating a truce, upon
the usual conditions, for an extended period of 10 years from the 1st of June 1843.
In the eyes of even the Qasimi Shaikh the prospect of an undisturbed pearl fishery
year by year outdid in attractiveness the possibility of taking naval revenge at
intervals upon his military rival the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.