'Extracts from Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia by J G Lorimer CIE, Indian Civil Service' [‎24r] (52/180)

37
The result of the rupture between Sharjah and Abu Dhabi was to prevent
the subjects of either Shaikh from taking part in the pearl fishery for the year,
an exclusion which was severely felt by both sides and led to a reconciliation in
October 1825 under the auspices of Sayid Sa'id of Masqat, then present on the
coast with a squadron of his vessels. In this settlement the Baraimi difficulty was
entirely ignored; but the demolition of the Dairah fort and the withdrawal of the
Sudan colony by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi were decreed. A curious clause,
probably representing the Saiyid's brokerage on the bargain, was added, but
apparently remained unfulfilled; it provided for the neutralisation of the town
of Dibai by the handing over of its defences to the ruler of Masqat. The
arrangement remained a dead-letter until 1827, when the dismantlement of Dairah
was enforced by Saiyid Sa'id with a naval force; but His Highness before his
departure compensated Shaikh Tahnun with a gift of military stores and encouraged
him to seize Dubai. The ruler of Masqat undoubtedly considered a rapprochement
between Sharjah and Abu Dhabi to be hostile to his own interests.
In 1829, before starting on his first expedition to East Africa, Saiyid Sa'id
endeavoured to arrange for the security of his possessions at home by granting
subsidies to some of the Pirate Coast chiefs, and among them Shaikh Sultan-bin-
Saqar was promised an allowance of Rs. 2,000 a year. Notwithstanding this
payment the faithless ruler of Sharjah was hardly restrained, at first by the
remonstrances of the chief men of his tribe and later by the menaces of the British
Government, from throwing in his lot with the rebels who in 1830 attempted to
upset the Saiyid's government.
After Sa'id's return from Africa he endeavoured to obtain the aid of Sultan-
bin-Saqar in his operations for the recovery of Sohar in 1831, but the Shaikh
hung back, demanding as the price of his support the transfer to himself of either
Dibah or Khor Fakkan, and eventually a raid by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on
Qasimi territory prevented his taking part on either side in the fighting at Sohar.
The movement "of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh was intended to embarrass Saiyid Sa'id,
who had declined his assistance at Sohar, probably because of the bad behaviour
of the Bani Yas contingent in an expedition against Bahrain in 1828. The only
one of the Pirate Coast chiefs who rallied to the side of Saiyid Sa'id before Sohar
was consequently Rashid-bin-Hamaid, Shaikh of 'Ajman, a dependent of Shajah:
on the defeat of the Masqat troops this unreliable ally changed sides and helped to
complete the Saiyid's discomfiture.
In 1832, on the occurrence of another rising against Saiyid Sa'id's authority
during his second absence in East Africa, Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar availed himself
of the opportunity to seize, by surprise or treachery, Dibah and the Shamailiyah
ports of Khor Fakkan and Ghallah, which were thus lost to the 'Oman Sultanate.
But for the timely arrival of two Masqat frigates, with reinforcements and stores,
it is probably that the town of Shinas also would have probably have fallen into his
hands.
Connection of the Wahhabi power with Pirate Coast affairs, 1820-35.
The prestige of the Wahhabi Amir was for a time destroyed by the successful
operations of the Egyptian and British forces against him and his dependents; but,
with the withdrawal of the Egyptians from Najd and of the British from Qishm,
his influence in 'Oman began to revive. Though in 1821 Sultan-bin-Saqar had
already abjured Wahhabi tenets, and though his authority was even then
preponderant over that of Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams, the official representative of
the Wahhabi interest on the Pirate Coast, it was nevertheless the case that in 1823 a
large proportion of the people were still Wahhabi in sympathy; but of the secular
power of the Wahhabi Amir there was no longer a trace to be found in the country.
In 1824 the Wahhabi state began to raise its head once more in Central
Arabia; and Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar and his chief dependent, Shaikh Rashid-
bin-Hamaid of 'Ajman, lost no time in creating interest for themselves with its
ruler. The negotiations were conducted quite openly on the part of the Shaikh
of Sharjah, who pretended that they were necessary for his safety.
In November 1825, in an interview with the British Resident, Shaikh Sultan-
bin-Saqar professed great fear of the growing power of the Wahhabis and enquired
whether he might rely on British aid in endeavouring to defend his independence
against them; he also asked what course he should follow if the Wahhabis were
to make war on the Saiyid of Masqat and demand the assistance of Sharjah. No
Designs of
the Sharjah
Shaikh,
1829-30.
Intrigues
relating
to the
operations
Sohar, 1831.
Annexation
by the
Sharjah
Shaikh of the
Shamailiyah
district.
Temporary
discredit
of the
Wahhabis,
1821-23.
Revival of
Wahhabi
influence.
1824.
Corre
spondence
between the
Shaikh of
Sharjah and
the British
48533
G 2
S'